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iiAbstract
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the relation between stock prices and
the macroeconomy using vector autoregressions (VARs). The ﬁrst essay focuses on the link
between stock prices and the current account. I ﬁnd that stock markets provide a channel, in
addition to the traditional exchange rate channel, through which external balance for a country
with a current account imbalance can be restored. The second essay explores the transmission
of U.S. stock price shocks to real activity and prices in G-7 countries. I achieve identiﬁcation
by imposing a small number of sign restrictions on impulse responses, while controlling for
monetary policy, business cycle and government spending shocks. The results suggest that
stock price movements are important for ﬂuctuations in G-7 real activity and prices, but do
not qualify as demand side business cycle shocks. The third essay investigates the impact of
monetary and technology shocks on the stock market. I ﬁnd an important role for technology
shocks, but not monetary shocks, in explaining variations in real stock prices. The identiﬁcation
method is ﬂexible enough to study the effects of technology news shocks. The responses are
consistent with the idea that news on technology improvements have an immediate impact on
stock prices.
Keywords: stock prices, current account ﬂuctuations, monetary policy, technology shocks,
news, international transmission, VARs, identiﬁcation with sign restrictions
iiiivZusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus drei thematisch verwandten Aufsätzen, die den Zu-
sammenhang zwischen Aktienpreisen und makroökonomischen Variablen mit Vektor Autore-
gressiven (VAR) Modellen untersuchen. Ich analysiere den Zusammenhang von Aktienpreisen
und Leistungsbilanz (Kapitel 1), die Transmission amerikanischer Aktienpreisbewegungen zur
Realwirtschaft und zu gesamtwirtschaftlichen Preisen in den G7 Ländern (Kapitel 2) und die Ef-
fekte geldpolitischer und technologischer Schocks auf den europäischen Aktienmarkt (Kapitel
3). Die drei Aufsätze folgen dem gleichen Prinzip. Ich erläutere zunächst die kontextrelevan-
te VAR Methode, u.a. ein Panel VAR und ein Bayesianisches VAR mit Vorzeichenrestriktionen,
bevor ich die empirischen Ergebnisse präsentiere und deren Relevanz sowie ihren Bezug zur
bestehenden Literatur diskutiere.
Die verwandte Literatur besteht aus einer zunehmenden Anzahl VAR basierter Forschungs-
arbeiten, die Aktienpreisbewegungen zur Erklärung makroökonomischer Phänomene heran-
ziehen. Zum Beispiel argumentieren Beaudry und Portier (2006), dass Aktienpreisbewegungen
in erster Linie die veränderten Erwartungen von Markteilnehmern in bezug auf zukünftige Pro-
duktivitätsentwicklungen widerspiegeln. Letztere wiederum sind ihrer Meinung nach ein be-
deutender Einﬂussfaktor des amerikanischen Wirtschaftszyklusses. Des Weiteren halten Fratz-
scher et al. (2007) Veränderungen in der relativen Aktienmarktkapitalisierung zugunsten der
Vereinigten Staaten für eine mögliche Ursache des amerikanischen Leistungsbilanzungleichge-
wichts. Zu einem vergleichbaren Ergebnis kommen Fratzscher und Straub (2009) in bezug auf
die G7 Länder. Sie sind der Meinung, dass Aktienpreisbewegungen einen beachtlichen Effekt
auf die Außenhandelsbilanzen haben. Ebenso erwähnenswert ist die Arbeit von Assenmacher-
Wesche und Gerlach (2008), die sich der Interaktion von Aktienpreisen, Realwirtschaft und
Konsumentenpreisen in industrialierten Ländern widmet und eine signiﬁkante Transmission
von Aktienpreisbewegungen zu letzteren ﬁndet.
Trotz der Größe und Bedeutung heutiger Aktienmärkte sowie der Beachtung, welche diese
in der empirischen Finanzmarktforschung erfahren haben, ist die Liste der Autoren, die sich
mit der Interaktion von Aktienpreisen und makroökonomischen Variablen in VAR Modellen
beschäftigen, vergleichsweise kurz. Ich werde in meinen drei Aufsätzen veranschaulichen, dass
VAR Modelle nützliche Instrumente sind, um sowohl die Bedeutung von Aktienpreisbewegun-
gen als Ursache makroökonomischer Schwankungen zu analysieren, als auch deren Funktion
alsTransmissionkanalökonomischerSchocks,wiez.B.Technologie-Schocks,zuuntersuchen.So
widmet sich der erste Aufsatz der Bedeutung von Aktienpreis- und Wechselkursbewegungen
sowie geldpolitischer Schocks für Schwankungen in der Leistungsbilanz. Während ein Großteil
vder bestehenden Literatur auf einige wenige Länder fokussiert, erstreckt sich meine Studie auf
ein Panel von 17 industrialisierten Ländern. Die Analyse basiert auf einem Panel VAR Modell,
welches das reale BIP, Konsumentenpreise, kurz- und langfristige Zinsen, Aktienpreise, Wech-
selkurse und die Leistungsbilanz als Variablen enhält. Ich ﬁnde keinen nennenswerten Einﬂuss
geldpolitischer Schocks auf die Leistungsbilanz. Dieses Ergebnis steht im Widerspruch zu em-
pirischen Befunden für die Vereinigten Staaten, kann aber auf das Verhalten des Wechselkurses,
welcher den Effekt des geldpolitischen Schocks insbesondere für kleine offene Volkswirtschaf-
ten ausgleicht, zurückgeführt werden.
Im Gegensatz dazu haben Aktienpreis- und Wechselkursbewegungen einen nennenswerten
Einﬂuss auf die Leistungsbilanz. Ein Anstieg der Aktienpreise von 10% hat eine Verschlechte-
rung der Leistungsbilanz um 0,3 Prozentpunkte zur Folge, während eine Aufwertung der hei-
mischen Währung in gleicher Größenordnung einen negativen Effekt von 0,4 Prozentpunkten
hat. Der Effekt des Aktienpreis-Schocks baut sich erst im Zeitverlauf auf und erreicht sein Ma-
ximum nach 9 bis 11 Quartalen. Abhängig von der gewählten Identiﬁzierungsmethode erreicht
der Wechselkurs-Schock seinen maximalen Effekt entweder nach 7 bis 11 Quartalen oder inner-
halb der ersten halben Jahres. Der letztere Befund steht somit im Widerspruch zum Mundell-
Fleming-Dornbusch Modell, welches impliziert, dass sich die Leistungsbilanz nach einer Auf-
wertung der heimischen Währung zunächst verbessert bevor sie sich im Zeitablauf verschlech-
tert. Ein solcher „J-Kurven Effekt“ kann häuﬁg im Zusammenhang mit VAR Modellen einzelner
Länder beobachtet werden, widerspricht jedoch der Intuition. Berücksichtigt man aber, dass es
mir der Panel Ansatz ermöglicht, die Impulsantwortfunktionen im Vergleich zu Modellen mit
nur einem Land präziser zu berechnen, so vermute ich, dass die Ergebnisse der bestehenden
VAR Literatur in erster Linie auf überparametrisierte und somit unpräzise berechnete Modelle
zurückzuführen sind.
Des Weiteren erklären Aktienpreis und Wechselkurs-Schocks sowohl über mittlere als auch
längere Prognosezeiträume einen beachtlichen Teil der Schwankungen in der Leistungsbilanz.
Dies gilt vor allem im Vergleich zu anderen Schocks, wie z.B. geldpolitischen Schocks. Die Ana-
lyse lässt mich vermuten, dass Aktienpreis und Wechselkurs-Schocks in etwa gleichbedeutend
für Veränderungen in der Leistungsbilanz sind. Somit ﬁnde ich einen Transmissionsmechanis-
mus, neben dem traditionellen Wechselkursmechanismus, durch den das Außenhandelsgleich-
gewicht für eine Volkswirtschaft mit einem Leistungsbilanzungleichgewicht wieder hergestellt
werden kann. Unter Berücksichtigung dessen, dass Aktienpreisbewegungen von 10% (oder
mehr) eher die Regel als die Ausnahme sind, ist dieses Ergebnis von ökonomischer Relevanz.
viIch vermute, dass Aktienpreisbewegungen durch folgenden Transmissionsmechanismus
Einﬂuss auf die Leistungsbilanz ausüben. Fallen Aktienpreise über einen längeren Zeitraum,
so hat dies einen Rückgang der realwirtschaftlichen Aktivität aufgrund von Wohlstands- und
Bilanzeffekten auf Privatkonsum und Privatinvestitionen zur Folge. Dieser wiederum reduziert
die Nachfrage nach Importen und verbessert die Leistungsbilanz. Der erste Aufsatz bietet je-
doch keine vollständige Analyse dieses Aktienpreiskanals und daher widme ich mich diesem
in meinem zweiten Aufsatz. Im Besonderen analysiere ich mit Hilfe eines Mehrländer VAR An-
satzes die Interaktion von Aktienpreisbewegungen und realwirtschaftlicher Aktivität in einem
internationalen Kontext.
Der zweite Aufsatz untersucht die Transmission von Preisbewegungen amerikanischer Ak-
tien zur Realwirtschaft und zu gesamtwirtschaftlichen Preisen in den G7 Ländern in den Jahren
1974-2005. Ich identiﬁziere Aktienpreis-Schocks indem ich den Vorzeichen der Impulsantwort-
funktionen einige wenige Restriktionen auferlege und gleichzeitig für die Effekte von geld-
und ﬁskalpolitischen sowie Wirtschaftsyzklus-Schocks kontrolliere. Im Vergleich zu verwand-
ten Studien beruht dieser Ansatz weder auf potentiell unplausiblen Kurzfristrestriktionen noch
ist er dogmatisch das Wesen von Aktienpreis-Schocks betreffend. Der Aufsatz ist eine Anwen-
dung der neuen Mehrländer VAR Methode von Canova und Ciccarelli (2009). Ich bevorzuge
das Mehrländer VAR gegenüber herkömmlichen Panel VAR Methoden, da es einige vorteilhafte
Eigenschaften aufweist. So erlaubt es mir, Abhängigkeiten zwischen Ländern oder Parameter-
heterogenität zu berücksichtigen. Des Weiteren ist das Mehrländer VAR auch auf relativ kurze
Zeitreihen anwendbar.
Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass amerikanische Aktienpreis-Schocks eine nicht zu
vernachlässigende Größe sind wenn es um die Analyse von Schwankungen in der realwirt-
schaftlichen Aktivität und den gesamtwirtschaftlichen Preisen in G7 Ländern geht. So erklä-
ren sie zwischen 9% und 40% der Schwankungen in der realwirtschaftlichen Aktivität der
Vereinigten Staaten und zwischen 12% und 16% für die restlichen G7 Länder. Des Weiteren
sind für alle G7 Länder zwischen 10% und 21% der Schwankungen des BIP Deﬂators die
Folge von Aktienpreis-Schocks. Ihr Beitrag ist jedoch geringer als der hervorgerufen durch
Wirtschaftsyzklus-Schocks. Dieses Ergebnis zusammen mit der Erkenntnis, dass Aktienpreis-
Schocks keine gleichgerichtete Bewegung von realwirtschaftlicher Aktivität und gesamtwirt-
schaﬂichen Preisen induzieren, lässt mich urteilen, dass Aktienpreis-Schocks nicht als nach-
frageorientierte Wirtschaftszyklus-Schocks bezeichnet werden können. Ich schlussfolgere auch,
dass Aktienpreisbewegungen nur teilweise das Result von Aktienpreis-Schocks sind als viel-
mehr die Folge anderer Schocks. Dies führt mich zu meinem dritten Aufsatz.
viiDer dritte Aufsatz untersucht die Ursachen von Schwankungen im europäischen Aktien-
markt mit einem Bayesianisches VAR Modell für den Zeitraum 1987-2005. Die Schätzperiode
beinhaltet die Jahre 1995-2003 als der Aktienmarkt eine ausgeprägte Auf- und Abschwungpha-
se durchlief. Im Rahmen des VAR Modells berücksichtige ich geldpolitische und technologi-
sche Schocks als potentielle Ursachen für Schwankungen im Aktienmarkt. Die Ergebnisse deu-
ten an, dass Technologie-Schocks aber nicht geldpolitische Schocks eine wichtige Rolle bei der
Erklärung von Aktienmarktbewegungen spielen. Technologie-Schocks eklären etwa 22% der
Schwankungen im Aktienmarkt während der Erklärungsgehalt von geldpolitischen Schocks
bei unter 5% liegt. Insbesondere während des Auf- und Abschwungs der Jahre 1995-2003 sind
Technologie-Schocks für nahezu alle Schwankungen verantwortlich. Ich ﬁnde auch einen si-
gniﬁkanten Effekt von Neuigkeiten über technologische Innovationen auf den Aktienmarkt.
Abschließend zeige ich, dass die Ergebnisse robust gegenüber der Berücksichtigung von ﬁskal-
politischen Schocks und Ölpreis-Schocks sind.
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xiiixivIntroduction
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the relation between stock prices and the
macroeconomy using vector autoregressive (VAR) models. In particular, I investigate the link
between stock prices and the current account (Chapter 1), the transmission of U.S. stock price
movements to real activity and prices in G-7 countries (Chapter 2), and the impact of monetary
and technology shocks on the euro area stock market (Chapter 3). All three essays follow the
same principle. First, I introduce a VAR method, ranging from panel and multicountry VARs to
a Bayesian VAR. I use existing methods to address topics of economic relevance, but also extend
methods, particularly with respect to the identiﬁcation of economic shocks. Second, I provide
empirical results and discuss their relevance and relation to the existing literature.
In fact, there is an increasing number of VAR-based studies that stress the role of stock
prices in explaining macroeconomic developments. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2006)
argue that shocks to stock prices reﬂect changes in agents’ expectations about future total factor
productivity and are an important driver of U.S. business cycles. Fratzscher et al. (2007) point
to stock market wealth as an explanation for U.S. external imbalances, while in an extension to
the G-7 countries, Fratzscher and Straub (2009) ﬁnd that shocks to stock returns have sizeable
effects on external accounts. Furthermore, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) study the
relationships between stock prices, real activity and prices in industrialized countries and ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant transmission of stock price shocks to the latter.
Despite the size and importance of today’s stock markets and the attention they received
in the empirical ﬁnance literature, the list of authors studying the interaction between stock
prices and the macroeconomy in a VAR context is surprisingly short. However, I show in three
essays that VARs are useful to evaluate both the role of stock prices in explaining ﬂuctuations
in macroeconomic variables and their importance in the transmission of economic shocks.
The ﬁrst essay explores the role of shocks to monetary policy, stock prices and exchange
rates in explaining current account ﬂuctuations. While a considerable fraction of the existing
literature focuses on individual countries, I extend the analysis to a set of 17 industrialized
economies. Based on a panel VAR model using data on real GDP, consumer prices, short and
long-term interest rates, stock prices, exchange rates and the current account, I ﬁnd a small role
for monetary policy shocks. This ﬁnding does not square with the empirical evidence for the
United States, but can be attributed to the behavior of the exchange rate, which mitigates the
effects of monetary policy shocks, in particular for small open economies.
In contrast, shocks to stock prices and exchange rates have a signiﬁcant impact on the cur-
rent account. While a 10% increase in stock prices leads to a deterioration of the current account
1of 0.3%, an appreciation of the exchange rate of similar magnitude depresses the current ac-
count by 0.4%. The effect of stock price shocks on the current account builds up gradually
over time and reaches its maximum after around 9-11 quarters. Depending on the identiﬁca-
tion scheme, exchange rate shocks exert their maximal inﬂuence either after 7-11 quarters or
within two quarters after the shock. The latter response of the current account to exchange rate
shocks is hence inconsistent with the prediction of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. In
this model, the current account improves on impact following an exchange rate appreciation,
before falling over time. Such a ’J-curve effect’ is frequently observed in single country VAR
models, but counterintuitive. Given that the panel set-up allows me to estimate the impulse
responses more precisely as compared to single country VARs, it seems plausible that the ﬁnd-
ings of the existing VAR literature are the result of overparametrized and hence imprecisely
estimated models.
Furthermore, stock price and exchange rate shocks explain a notable fraction of the variation
of thecurrentaccountatmedium andlong-term forecast horizonsas comparedtoothersshocks,
in particular monetary policy shocks. The analysis suggests that stock price and exchange rate
shocks are about equally important in explaining current account ﬂuctuations. Hence I ﬁnd a
channel, in addition to the traditional exchange rate channel, through which external balance
for an OECD country with a current account imbalance can be restored. Given that stock price
movements of 10% (or more) are the norm rather than the exception, the results are of economic
relevance.
Where does the impact of stock price shocks on the current account position come from? It
seems likely that an extended period of falling stock prices leads to a contraction in real activity
through wealth effects on consumption and balance sheet effects on investment, which in turn
should reduce the demand for imports and improve the current account. The ﬁrst essay, how-
ever, does not provide a full description of this stock market channel and I aim at ﬁlling this gap
in the second. Particularly, I focus on the interaction between stock prices movements and real
activity in an international context. For that purpose, I move beyond conventional panel VAR
techniques and use a multicountry VAR instead.
The second essay investigates the transmission of U.S. stock price movements to real activity
and prices in G-7 countries in the period 1974-2005. I achieve identiﬁcation by imposing a small
number of sign restrictions on impulse responses, while controlling for monetary policy, busi-
ness cycle and government spending shocks. In contrast to related studies, the approach does
neither rely on potentially implausible short-run restrictions nor is it dogmatic with respect to
the nature of stock price shocks. The essay is an application of the novel multicountry VAR
2methodology of Canova and Ciccarelli (2009), which I prefer to conventional panel VAR ap-
proaches since it has a number of appealing features. Among others, it allows for cross-country
lagged interdependencies, heterogeneous dynamics and time series of moderate length.
I ﬁnd that U.S. stock price movements are important for ﬂuctuations in G-7 real activity
and prices even when controlling for others shocks. They explain between 9% and 40% of
the variation in real activity for the United States and 12% to 16% for the other G-7 countries.
Moreover, between 10% and 21% of the variation in the GDP deﬂator across G-7 countries is due
to such shocks. However, these numbers are smaller than those for U.S. business cycle shocks.
This ﬁnding, together with the observation that stock price shocks do not induce a positive
comovement of real activity and prices, leads me to conclude that shocks to stock prices do not
qualify as demand side business cycle shocks. In addition, I ﬁnd that stock price movements
are to a large extent due to shocks other than stock price shocks. This last observation leads me
to the third essay.
The third essay focuses on the underlying sources of movements in the euro area stock mar-
ket. I address this issue by estimating a Bayesian VAR model on 1987-2005 data. The sample pe-
riod covers the 1995-2003 episode when the stock market experienced a pronounced boom-bust
cycle. Within the VAR framework, I consider monetary and technology shocks as underlying
disturbances. I ﬁnd an important role for technology shocks, but not monetary shocks, in ex-
plaining variations in real stock prices. Over the sample period, more than 22% of the variation
in stock prices can be attributed to technology shocks while monetary shocks explain less than
5%. Moreover, technology shocks are responsible for almost all variation in stock prices during
the boom-bust cycle of 1995-2003. In addition, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant response of stock prices to
technology news shocks. And ﬁnally, I show that these ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of
additional disturbances, such as government spending or oil price shocks.
31 Cross-country evidence on the relation between stock
prices and the current account
This chapter explores the relation between stock prices and the current account for 17 OECD
countries in 1980-2007. I use a panel vector autoregression (VAR) to compare the effects of stock
price shocks to those originating from monetary policy and exchange rates. While monetary
policy shocks have little effects, shocks to stock prices and exchange rates have sizeable effects.
A 10% contraction in stock prices improves the current account by 0.3% after two years. Hence
I ﬁnd a channel, in addition to the traditional exchange rate channel, through which external
balance for an OECD country with a current account imbalance can be restored.
1.1 Introduction
The determinants of current account ﬂuctuations have been discussed extensively in the aca-
demic literature in recent years. One reason is that the dispersion in current account positions
has never been so large as today. This triggered worries that an unwinding of global imbal-
ances could cause a severe global ﬁnancial crisis. In the wake of the current ﬁnancial crisis, it is
even more important to understand the sources of these imbalances and the likely adjustment
mechanisms. Particularly the role of stock prices is of interest and is thus the central issue of
this chapter. The existing literature on the link between stock prices and the current account
is small and concentrates on individual countries. In contrast, I extend the analysis to a broad
set of OECD countries and compare the effects of stock price shocks to those originating from
monetary policy and exchange rates.
Since the U.S. current account imbalance is so large, many authors focus on the U.S. in their
analysis. While some point to low private savings in the U.S. as a main driver of this imbalance
(see, e.g., Krugman, 2007), others investigate the role of public savings (see, e.g., Erceg et al.,
2005; Corsetti and Müller, 2006, among others). From a simple accounting perspective, budget
and current account deﬁcits move in the same direction. Thus, the swing of the U.S. ﬁscal po-
sition from surplus to deﬁcit during the Bush era may have accelerated the deterioration of the
U.S. current account. However, the two aforementioned papers ﬁnd little impact of ﬁscal shocks
on the current account and reject what is known as the ’twin deﬁcit’ hypothesis. Moreover, Kim
and Roubini (2008) ﬁnd even evidence of a ’twin divergence’, i.e., when ﬁscal accounts worsen,
the current account improves and vice versa.
Another camp identiﬁes productivity shocks as a main determinant of the current account
(see, e.g., Bussière et al., 2005; Corsetti et al., 2006; Bems et al., 2007, among others). Country-
4speciﬁc productivity shocks raise relative consumption as well as the price of nontradables and
deteriorate the trade balance. Corsetti et al. (2006) ﬁnd evidence that this effect is particularly
persistent for the United States. A third strand focuses on the role exchange rates play in restor-
ing external balance for countries with large external deﬁcits (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1995; Blanchard et al., 2005, among others). A common result of this literature is that a large
and steady depreciation of the exchange rate is needed to rebalance the current account (see,
e.g., Krugman, 2007).
Despite the vast literature on the sources of current account ﬂuctuations, it is striking that
only few authors discuss the contribution of stock price shocks to the emergence of global im-
balances. Some notable and recent exceptions are Fratzscher et al. (2007), Barnett and Straub
(2008) and Fratzscher and Straub (2009). The motivation is the following. While the U.S. reports
remarkable current account deﬁcits, many countries, particularly from emerging Asia and the
Middle East, run current account surpluses of similar magnitude. Having recovered from the
1997-1998 Asian crisis, the demand for foreign exchange reserves was huge among Asian coun-
tries. Since the U.S. ﬁnancial market is the largest and most liquid in the world, a dominant
fraction of these reserves were invested in U.S. dollar denominated assets, particularly in U.S.
government bonds. Furthermore, the surge in oil prices created large surpluses among the oil-
exporting countries that were in turn reinvested in U.S. bonds and equity. In addition, the lack
of well functioning capital markets in the emerging world spurred the demand for U.S. assets.
As Bernanke (2005) puts it, a ’saving glut’ in Asia and among oil-exporting countries is a poten-
tial driver of the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Consequently, I expect that the (relative) attractiveness of a country’s ﬁnancial market is an
important determinant of international capital ﬂows. If a country experiences a favorable stock
price shock more funds are allocated to the country, the exchange rate is likely to appreciate
and the current account worsens. Furthermore, the increase in stock prices may impact on real
activity through wealth effects on consumption and balance sheet effects on investment. Both
raise the demand for imports and deteriorate the current account.
Of course, there is no clear structural interpretation of a stock price shock. Building on
the assumption that stock prices are forward-looking and thus reﬂect people’s expectations, a
large body of the literature interprets shocks to them as shifts in expectations, and so do I. For
example, people expect productivity to rise in the future or the share of a country’s output in
the world to increase (see Engel and Rogers, 2006). Alternatively, one may also think of stock
price shocks in the form of rational bubbles (see Kraay and Ventura, 2005).
5Fratzscher et al. (2007) ﬁnd that shocks to stock prices have large and persistent effects on
the U.S. trade balance. Using a Bayesian VAR, they measure the impact of a 10% increase in
stock prices to be 0.9% over 10-15 quarters and ﬁnd this effect to be larger than that of the ex-
change rate. In a more recent study Fratzscher and Straub (2009) extend the analysis to the
G-7 economies and obtain again evidence of a signiﬁcant impact of stock price movements on
the trade balance. However, the response of the trade balance to stock price shocks varies sub-
stantially across countries, suggesting that a strong response is probably unique to the United
States.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following way. Using a panel vec-
tor autoregression, I investigate the impact of monetary policy, stock price and exchange rate
shocks on the current account. The panel set-up allows me to ﬁlter out country-speciﬁc effects
andto study the average effects of the three shocks. The results suggest that bothstock price and
exchange rate shocks have a signiﬁcant impact, while monetary policy shocks have little effects.
Hence I ﬁnd a channel, in addition to the traditional exchange rate channel, through which ex-
ternal balance for an OECD country with current account deﬁcits can be restored. An extended
period of falling stock prices is likely to reduce real activity through wealth and balance sheet
effects as well as the demand for imports and thus improves the current account.
Therestofthischapterisorganizedasfollows. Section1.2outlinesthepanelVARmodeland
the identiﬁcation strategy. An impulse response analysis and a forecast error variance decom-
position are presented in Section 1.3. Moreover, I provide robustness checks. Finally, Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Panel VAR model
I use a panel VAR of the form:
Yit = Bi (L)Yi,t−1 + Ci (L)Dt + uit, (1.1)
where i = 1,2,...,N; t = 1,2,...,T; Yit is a G×1 vector of endogenous variables for each country
i, Bi are G×G matrices in the lag operator L, Dt is a K ×1 vector which includes deterministic
variables (e.g., a constant, a time trend or a dummy) or common exogenous variables (e.g.,
oil prices), Ci are G × K matrices in the lag operator L, and uit is a G × 1 vector of random
disturbances with mean zero and country-speciﬁc variance σ2
i .
I include seven endogenous variables for each country: real GDP, consumer prices, a nomi-
nal short-term interest rate, a nominal long-term interest rate, nominal stock prices, a real effec-
6tive exchange rate, and a current account to GDP ratio. The estimation period is 1980Q1-2007Q4
and I provide a description of the data in Appendix A.1. The variables are expressed in logs, ex-
cept the interest rate variables and the current account to GDP ratio, which are in percent. Since
the current account is measured with respect to the ’rest of the world’, I ﬁnd it appropriate to
incorporate all other endogenous variables in relative terms. I proceed in the following way.
First, I construct bilateral trade weights for each country with all other countries in the panel
and each period. Particulary, the weight that I attach to country j for country i in period t is:
ωi,j,t =
impi,j,t + expi,j,t
 N
j=1 (impi,j,t + expi,j,t)
, (1.2)
where impi,j,t is the amount of goods and services (in millions of U.S. dollars) that is imported
by country i from country j in period t, expi,j,t is the amount of goods and services that is
exported by country i to countryj in period t and
 N
j=1 (impi,j,t + expi,j,t) is the total sum of
imports and exports of country i with all other countries in period t. Obviously, ωi,j,t = 0 for
i = j. Thus, ωi,j,t captures the importance of country j for country i with respect to trade.
Second, I calculate foreign variables for each country i as follows:
x∗
it =
N  
j=1
ωi,j,txjt. (1.3)
Using time-varying rather than ﬁxed weights allows me to control for changing patterns
in global trade. I proceed like this for (log) real GDP (yit), (log) consumer prices (pit), nomi-
nal short-term interest rates (rs
it), nominal long-term interest rates (rl
it) and (log) nominal stock
prices (sit). But not for the (log) real effective exchange rate (REERit) and the current account
to GDP ratio (cait) since both are already measured relative to major trading partners. Finally, I
obtain relative variables by substracting foreign from domestic variables. Hence, the vector of
endogenous variables becomes
Yit =
 
yit − y∗
it pit − p∗
it rs
it − rs∗
it rl
it − rl∗
it sit − s∗
it REERit cait
 ′
. (1.4)
The construction of foreign variables is comparable to the procedure of Pesaran et al. (2004)
or Dees et al. (2007) in a Global VAR context. Moreover, Fratzscher et al. (2007) follow a similar
strategy for the U.S. and specify the variables relative to the rest of the world. However, they
use weights based on global GDP shares rather than trade weights. Alternatively, I could in-
clude domestic and foreign variables separately. Given the number of variables, however, this
procedure is computationally hardly feasible.
7One purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the effects of monetary policy shocks on the cur-
rent account and therefore I include all relevant channels through which monetary policy im-
pacts on the economy. Monetary policy impacts on short and long-term interest rates and thus
on the term structure. Furthermore, monetary policy is transmited to the economy through
stock prices and exchange rates. I include nominal stock prices since I expect that movements
in them have contributed to the development of global imbalances in the last three decades.
Finally, I add the real effective exchange rate to capture the external competitiveness of the
country under study.
The vector of common exogenous variables, Dt, includes the U.S. dollar price of oil, poil
t , and
a constant for each country. The oil price is considered for several reasons. First, it is a well
known shortcoming of VAR analyses that inﬂation expectations cannot be taken into account
explicitly. Including oil or commodity prices helps to overcome this problem since both are
correlated with inﬂation expectations. Second, some of the countries in the panel are net oil
exporters (notably Canada, Norway and the UK) and are inﬂuenced by movements in the price
of oil. Third, I do not control for cross-section dependence in the panel and expect that including
an observed common factor reduces inefﬁences that arise in this context.
Preliminary estimation of individual VAR models suggests that a lag order of four for the
endogenous variables is optimal, using lag order selection criteria like AIC, SBC or likelihood
ratio tests, and is thus set to four for all countries. Furthermore, the oil price enters contempo-
raneously and with one lag.
Following Swamy (1970) and Pesaran and Smith (1995), I assume that the Bi and Ci matrices
vary across countries according to the following random coefﬁcient model:
Bpi = Bp + η1,p,i, Cqi = Cq + η2,q,i, (1.5)
where Bp and Cq are G × G and G × K constant matrices, η1,p,i and η2,q,i are G × G and G × K
random matrices, and p and q are the respective lag orders. Furthermore, η1,p,i and η2,q,i are
distributed independently of uit with zero mean and constant covariance matrices Ω1p and Ω2q,
i.e. vec(η1,p,i) ∼ iid(0,Ω1p) and vec(η2,q,i) ∼ iid(0,Ω2q).
As long as the time series dimension T is sufﬁciently large to run individual time series re-
gressions, I can estimate the panel VAR in several ways: ﬁrst, by stacking the data and using
standard pooled estimators such as the random or ﬁxed effects estimator; second, by estimat-
ing individual VARs for each country seperately and averaging the estimated coefﬁcients across
countries. The second approach is proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and is known as the
mean group estimator. Provided the panel is not only large with respect to time, but also homo-
8geneous (i.e. η1,p,i = η2,q,i = 0 for all i), all estimators yield consistent and unbiased estimates
of the coefﬁcients for N being large as well. But if the coefﬁcients differ across countries (i.e.
η1,p,i  = η2,q,i  = 0 for some i), the random and ﬁxed effects estimators give inconsistent and po-
tentially misleading estimates of the coefﬁcients (see Nickell, 1981). The mean group estimator,
however, is consistent even in the presence of parameter heterogeneity for N and T being large.
Since the cross-sectional and the time series dimension are both sufﬁciently large (N = 17 and
T = 112) and some degree of parameter heterogeneity across countries seems likely, I prefer the
mean group estimator and estimate the coefﬁcient matrices as follows:
ˆ Bp =
1
N
N  
i=1
ˆ Bpi, ˆ Cq =
1
N
N  
i=1
ˆ Cqi, (1.6)
for p = 1,2,...,pmax and q = 0,1,...,qmax. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the mean group
estimator converges relatively fast and that ˆ Bp and ˆ Cq are appropriate measures of the average
effects of Yi,t−p and Dt−q on Yit.
Furthermore, I obtain all relevant statistics, such as impulse responses or a forecast error
variance decomposition, accordingly, i.e., by averaging the respective numbers over all coun-
tries.
1.2.2 Identiﬁcation
A common way of analyzing the dynamics of a panel VAR is to calculate impulse responses.
I assume that the reduced form errors (uit) are linked to the structural innovations (ǫit) in the
following way:
uit = Aiǫit. (1.7)
To achieve identiﬁcation, I impose the restriction that the Ai matrices are lower triangular. Such
a recursive identiﬁcation scheme is frequently employed in the literature and leaves it to me to
specify the instantaneous causal ordering of the variables. In what follows, I assume that the
variables in the system are ordered as in Yit.
Monetary policy shocks raise the relative short-term interest rate (rs
it − rs∗
it > 0), but do not
have any contemporaneous impact on either real GDP or consumer prices. Both variables re-
spond with a lag of one quarter to changes in monetary policy. However, I allow the ﬁnancial
market variables (long-term interest rates, stock prices and exchange rates) to respond immedi-
ately to changes in short-term interest rates. Similar identiﬁcation schemes are often used in the
9Table 1.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the variables in levels
y − y∗ p − p∗ rs − rs∗ rl − rl∗ s − s∗ REER ca
Australia −2.22 −2.72 −2.98 −3.61† −3.42 −1.97 −3.86†
Austria −1.70 −2.36 −3.66† −2.97 −2.07 −1.74 −2.10
Belgium −2.34 −3.04 −2.24 −2.55 −2.71 −2.63 −0.89
Canada −1.71 −4.00† −3.06 −3.27 −0.55 −0.92 −1.66
France −2.59 −4.30† −2.72 −1.59 −2.37 −2.54 −0.72
Germany −1.46 −2.74 −2.80 −1.27 −2.69 −2.35 −1.07
Italy −0.87 −3.12 −3.22 −3.00 −2.68 −2.32 −1.73
Japan −1.81 −2.71 −4.20† −2.87 −2.25 −1.36 −2.58
Korea −1.52 −2.31 −2.11 −2.67 −1.83 −2.26 −3.26
Netherlands −2.82 −2.03 −2.73 −3.01 −1.82 −1.89 −2.67
New Zealand −2.10 −2.47 −2.21 −2.27 −2.28 −2.69 −2.38
Norway −2.11 −2.51 −3.29 −2.69 −1.68 −2.23 −3.40
Spain −1.41 −4.43† −4.71† −3.24 −2.76 −2.06 −1.84
Sweden −0.86 −1.25 −2.83 −2.54 −4.06† −2.84 −1.44
Switzerland 0.27 −2.07 −1.17 −1.83 −1.91 −2.42 −3.49†
UK −2.42 −0.77 −2.60 −2.61 −1.74 −2.79 −2.50
U.S. −2.22 −3.75† −3.49† −2.65 −1.67 −2.61 −1.90
Notes: ADF tests include a constant and a trend. A † denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
analysis of monetary policy transmission in an open economy context (see, e.g., Eichenbaum
and Evans, 1995; Grilli and Roubini, 1996, among others).
Stock price shocks are associated with an increase in relative stock prices (sit − s∗
it > 0).
Again, real GDP and consumer prices respond with a lag. Furthermore, it seems likely that
monetary policy takes changes in stock prices into account since they potentially inﬂuence real
GDP and consumer prices. However, I do not expect that monetary policy reacts instanta-
neously to changes in stock prices but only if they rise or fall for a longer period of time. The
same argument applies to the exchange rate. Hence, both variables are ordered after real GDP,
consumer prices and the short-term interest rate.
Within the block of ﬁnancial market variables an appropriate ordering is, however, unclear.
Butitturnsoutthattheimpulseresponsesarerobusttoalternativeorderingschemes. Therefore,
I order the ﬁnancial market variables as follows: ﬁrst, long-term interest rates; second, stock
prices; and third, the real effective exchange rate. Furthermore, exchange rate shocks raise the
real effective exchange rate (REERit > 0).
10Table 1.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the variables in differences
y − y∗ p − p∗ rs − rs∗ rl − rl∗ s − s∗ REER ca
Australia −4.44† −3.30† −4.50† −3.90† −4.68† −3.62† −4.70†
Austria −4.83† −3.92† −5.15† −4.90† −3.67† −4.69† −5.79†
Belgium −5.75† −4.65† −6.86† −5.08† −6.30† −3.80† −6.43†
Canada −4.47† −2.81 −5.05† −4.74† −5.28† −3.12† −6.64†
France −3.67† −1.97 −5.18† −4.60† −5.82† −4.15† −5.28†
Germany −3.55† −2.13 −4.46† −4.92† −4.73† −5.45† −4.42†
Italy −4.90† −2.12 −4.65† −4.77† −7.06† −4.62† −4.96†
Japan −3.78† −3.93† −5.86† −6.31† −4.08† −4.02† −4.62†
Korea −4.48† −5.31† −5.45† −5.83† −4.95† −4.55† −4.68†
Netherlands −3.62† −2.02† −4.88† −3.71† −3.50† −4.56† −5.98†
New Zealand −5.52† −2.87 −5.45† −4.98† −4.54† −4.06† −5.80†
Norway −3.77† −2.71 −4.90† −4.12† −5.10† −5.96† −4.76†
Spain −4.37† −2.37 −5.94† −6.53† −4.54† −3.87† −3.62†
Sweden −3.71† −2.85 −6.16† −6.49† −4.55† −4.49† −6.35†
Switzerland −5.23† −3.73† −6.99† −5.09† −3.76† −4.96† −4.72†
UK −3.41† −3.43† −6.04† −5.91† −5.52† −5.22† −5.86†
U.S. −4.38† −3.02† −3.04† −4.92† −4.58† −3.40† −3.78†
Notes: ADF tests include a constant only. A † denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Finally, I order the current account to GDP ratio last, imposing the restriction that the current
account responds immediately to changes in other variables, but these react only with a lag to
changes in the current account. This seems plausible since the current account is nothing else
than the accumulation of foreign assets or debt (if one abstracts from valuation effects) and I do
not expect that variables react to changes in the stock of net foreign assets within the period.
1.3 The results
1.3.1 Unit root tests
Before presenting the main results in the next sections, I explore the integrating properties of
the variables in the panel VAR. I have to decide whether estimating the model in levels or ﬁrst
differences, which depends on the order of integration of the variables. Table 1.1 shows the
results of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for the endogenous variables in level
speciﬁcation. The ADF regressions contain a constant and a time trend. I set the lag order for
the ﬁrst differences equal to ﬁve. I report similar test results for the endogenous variables in
11ﬁrst differences in Table 1.2. In this case the ADF regressions include a constant only and the
lag length is four. The results are insensitive to variations in the lag length.
Overall, there is strong evidence that nearly all of the variables in the panel are integrated of
orderone. Infact, formostofthecountriesthenullofaunitrootinthelevelcannotberejectedat
a 5 percent signiﬁcance level for any variable. In contrast, the test statistics for the endogenous
variables in ﬁrst differences are, with only a few exceptions, highly signiﬁcant. Consequently, I
conclude that the endogenous variables are I(1). I draw the same conclusion for the oil price.
In this case the test results are -0.48 (level) and -5.53 (ﬁrst difference), respectively. Thus, it
would be a valid strategy to estimate the panel VAR in ﬁrst differences. However, differencing
the variables destroys cointegrating relationships in the model. Therefore, I estimate the panel
VAR in levels, taking any cointegrating relationships implicitly into account. Indeed, Johansen
cointegration tests indicate that there is evidence of at least one cointegrating vector, implying
that the individual country models can be estimated in levels.
1.3.2 Dynamic responses to monetary policy shocks
Figure 1.1 shows the responses of real GDP, consumer prices, short-term interest rates, long-
term interest rates, stock prices, the exchange rate and the current account to one standard error
monetary policy shocks, corresponding to an increase in the short-term interest rate of about 50
basis points. I report the responses when the VAR coefﬁcients are ﬁxed at their ordinary least
squares (OLS) point estimates, together with a 90 percent conﬁdence interval. I construct error
bands using a non-parametric bootstrap that I describe in Appendix A.2. The ﬁgure shows the
responses at each horizon between 0 and 28 quarters after the shock.
As you can see, the effect on the short-term interest rate settles at around zero after two
and a half years. Long-term interest rates rise immediately, however, the initial impact is only
one third of that of the short-term interest rate. Long-term interest rates fall thereafter and the
response is zero after two and a half years. Real GDP contracts signiﬁcantly following monetary
policy shocks and reaches its trough after two years, before it recovers. Consumer prices rise
on impact, displaying a ’price puzzle’, but start to fall after around two years. Including oil
prices does not help to overcome the ’price puzzle’ in my context, presumably the result of the
sample period chosen or the fact that I include them as exogenous, not endogenous, variable.
Furthermore, stock prices fall sharply in response to a monetary policy tightening, but recover
quickly. The trough is reached after four quarters. Furthermore, the response of the exchange
rate, which is deﬁned in such a way that an increase means an appreciation, exhibits a puzzle as
well. The domestic currency depreciates on impact and it takes nearly one year until the effect
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Figure 1.1: Monetary policy shocks
Notes: I show the responses when the VAR coefﬁcients are ﬁxed at their OLS point estimates, together
with a 90 percent conﬁdence interval. Entries are percent.
turns positive. But since consumer prices are used to construct the exchange rate, and consumer
prices show a ’price puzzle’, it is not suprising that the ’price puzzle’ is evident in the response
of the exchange rate as well. Overall, these ﬁndings are compatible with those of a large body
of the monetary VAR literature.
The response of the current account is ambiguous. It is slightly negative on impact, but
quickly changes sign and is above the initial level after seven quarters. After about three years it
settles at around zero. Moreover, the response is never signiﬁcantly different from zero. Conse-
quently, it seems implausible that loose monetary policies contribute to current account deﬁcits.
While an expansionary monetary policy shock raises domestic demand and deteriorates net ex-
ports, it also depreciates the domestic currency and improves net exports. The results of the
impulse response analysis suggest that the overall effect on net exports, or more exactly the
current account, is about zero.
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Figure 1.2: Stock price shocks
Notes: See Figure 1.1
1.3.3 Dynamic responses to stock price shocks
Figure 1.2 shows the responses to one standard error shocks that raise relative stock prices by
morethan4%initially. Aswecansee, theriseinstockpricesisfollowedbyasigniﬁcantandlong
lasting increase in both real GDP and consumer prices, suggesting the presence of wealth and
balance sheet effects on consumption and investment, respectively. Moreover, I can distinguish
between stock price shocks and technology disturbances. While the former induce a positive
correlation between real GDP and consumer prices, the latter are typically associated with a
negative correlation. This distinction between stock price and technology shocks is important
since I expect that technology innovations are a potential source for movements in stock prices.
Furthermore, in response to the increase in real GDP and rising consumer prices, the mon-
etary policy authority is tightening. Short-term interest rates display a hump-shaped pattern,
consistent with the idea that monetary policy follows a Taylor-type feedback rule when setting
short-term interest rates. In addition, long-term interest rates react positively as well. The effect
on the exchange rate is, however, unclear. While the point estimate suggests that the domes-
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Figure 1.3: Exchange rate shocks
Notes: See Figure 1.1
tic currency appreciates, the uncertainty surrounding the impulse response is high. Finally, the
current account worsens immediately (though not signiﬁcantly) and reaches a trough after eight
quarters. Thereafter, the current account improves and external balance is restored after around
ﬁve years. The maximum impact of the 4% (a 10 %) increase in stock prices on the current ac-
count is -0.12% (-0.3%). Hence, the impact of stock price shocks on the current account is not
only statistically but also economically signiﬁcant, given that stock price movements of 10% (or
more) are the norm rather than the exception. Moreover, the results are compatible with these
in Fratzscher and Straub (2009), who report responses of the trade balance to stock price shocks
(of size 10%) between -1.02% (for Germany) and 0.28% (for the UK) after eight quarters.
1.3.4 Dynamic responses to exchange rate shocks
I show the responses to one standard error innovations in the exchange rate in Figure 1.3. The
exchange rate appreciates by 1.8% on impact, falls thereafter and ﬁnally settles around zero
after 12 quarters. The appreciation is associated with a loss of external competitiveness and
15Table 1.3: Forecast error variance decomposition of the current account variable
Horizon y − y∗ p − p∗ rs − rs∗ rl − rl∗ s − s∗ REER ca
4 6 2 5 3 3 4 77
8 6 3 6 5 7 7 65
12 7 5 7 6 10 9 57
16 9 6 7 6 12 11 50
20 11 7 7 6 14 11 43
24 13 8 7 6 16 12 38
Notes: Entries are percent. I ﬁx the VAR coefﬁcients at their OLS point estimates.
net exports are likely to fall. Thus, real GDP contracts signiﬁcantly following exchange rate
shocks. Furthermore, the appreciation lowers import prices and as a consequence consumer
prices fall. Consumer prices reach a through after around eight quarters. Monetary policy
authorities respond to the fall in real GDP and consumer prices by lowering short-term interest
rates, while long-term interest rates match the behavior of short-term interest rates nearly one-
to-one. In addition, stock prices fall immediately and are well below their initial level after ﬁve
years, reﬂecting the contraction in real GDP.
The current account falls sharply in response to the appreciation. It reaches a trough right
in the ﬁrst quarter after the shock and then improves. However, the response is negative for the
next ﬁve years. The effect of exchange rate shocks on the current account is strong, signiﬁcant
and long lasting. A 10% increase in the exchange rate depresses the current account by 0.4%,
more than the impact of stock price shocks of similar magnitude.
1.3.5 Forecast error variance decomposition
The forecast error variance decomposition shows the proportion of the unanticipated changes
of a variable that can be attributed to own innovations and to innovations to other variables in
the system. Table 1.3 shows the variance decomposition of the current account. I ﬁx the VAR
coefﬁcients at their OLS point estimates and identify monetary policy, stock price and exchange
rate shocks in the same recursive way as before. Moreover, I report the contribution of the
structural innovations up to 24 quarters following the shock.
For instance, 77% of the 4-step ahead forecast error variance of the current account is due
to own innovations. This number decreases considerably over time and is 38% after six years.
Moreover, innovations in consumer prices and long-term interest rates contribute less than 8%
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Figure 1.4: Current account. Distribution of impulse responses
Notes: I show the distribution (shaded area) of responses to monetary policy, stock price and exchange
rate shocks based on 5,040 different recursive identiﬁcation schemes. I ﬁx the VAR coefﬁcients at their
OLS point estimates.
over all forecast horizons. 13% of the forecast error variance of the current account is accounted
for by innovations in real GDP. Givent that I do not attach any structural interpretation to these
shocks, the numbers are difﬁcult to interpret.
For any forecast horizon, monetary policy shocks contribute less than 8%. This is compatible
with the results of the impulse response analysis. Monetary policy shocks are thus not a main
source of ﬂuctuations in the current account. This is in contrast to the ﬁndings of Barnett and
Straub (2008) who identify the U.S. Federal funds rate as a main source of the variability in the
U.S. current account. They estimate the contribution of monetary policy shocks to the forecast
error variance to be 62% at low forecast horizons and 41% at a seven year forecast horizon.
Furthermore, Fratzscher et al. (2007) ﬁnd also evidence that monetary policy exerts inﬂuence.
However, their numbers are considerably smaller and comparable to those stemming from my
panel VAR.
The results are different for innovations in stock prices and the exchange rate. For long-
term forecasts, 16% and 12% of the forecast error variance is accounted for by stock price and
exchange rate innovations, respectively. Thus, both variables contribute substantially to the
forecast error variance of the current account and their joint contribution is nearly as large
as the contribution of all other variables together (not taking own innovations into account).
Fratzscher et al. (2007) instead report a much smaller impact of the exchange rate on the U.S.
trade balance. Only a small fraction of the variability can be attributed to exchange rate shocks
at long-term forecast horizons. Exchange rate movements appear less important for the U.S.
than for other countries. This is not surprising since the U.S. is a large and rather closed econ-
17Figure 1.5: Current account. Distribution of size and location of peak deterioration or
improvement
Notes: I show the distribution of size (in percent) and location (in quarters) of peak deterioration or
improvement, conditional on monetary policy, stock price and exchange rate shocks and based on 5,040
different recursive identiﬁcation schemes. I ﬁx the VAR coefﬁcients at their OLS point estimates.
omy. However, most countries in my panel are small, open and thus sensitive to exchange rate
movements. But the results reconcile with the notion that stock prices explain a considerable
part of current account ﬂuctuations. Though the effect is smaller than typically found for the
U.S., it is nevertheless notable.
1.3.6 Robustness
As a robustness check, I evaluate how sensitive the results are to variations in identiﬁcation. In
particular, I estimate the 7-variable panel VAR and construct impulse respones using all 5,040
possible Cholesky orderings. Since I am interested in identiﬁcation uncertainty, but not sam-
pling uncertainty, I ﬁx the VAR coefﬁcients at their OLS point estimates. As a result of this
exercise, Iobtainadistribution ofimpulse responsesforthecurrentaccountvariable. Theproce-
dure is agnostic with respect to the appropriate ordering of the variables and thus conservative
in measuring identiﬁcation uncertainty.
Figure 1.4 shows the responses of the current account to monetary policy, stock price and ex-
change rate shocks, respectively. The top of the shaded area represents the maximum response
for each quarter and the lower end corresponds to the minimum. As you can see, the shape of
the respones is the same as when using the benchmark identiﬁcation scheme, while the uncer-
tainty surrounding the point estimates is moderate, suggesting that the results are independent
of the restrictions imposed on the covariance matrix. In fact, the covariance matrix is nearly
diagonal and thus different identiﬁcation schemes inevitably lead to similar results.
18Furthermore, Figure 1.5 delivers the joint distribution of the peak and its altitude for the
current account. Following monetary policy shocks, the current account improves by 0.05%
after 7-9 quarters, conﬁrming that monetary policy shocks have at best a moderate impact on
the current account. In contrast, stock price shocks have sizeable effects. Following stock price
shocks, the current account worsens by more than 0.1% after 9-11 quarters. The distribution is
sharply peaked, which leads to the conclusion that this results holds regardless of the identi-
ﬁcation scheme employed. As you can see, the results are different for exchange rate shocks.
There is considerable mass on an early and strong as well as on a late and somewhat milder
deterioration. This is the result of the w-shaped response of the current account to exchange
rate shocks. Depending on whether one allows the current account to respond instantaneously
or not, the peak deterioration is either 0.1% after 1-2 quarters or 0.08% after 7-11 quarters.
I conclude that the responses of the current account to both monetary policy and stock price
shocks are robust to different identiﬁcation schemes. With respect to exchange rate shocks, I
ﬁnd that the location of the peak deterioration is sensitive to changes in identiﬁcation, but not
the size of the peak.
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the role of shocks to monetary policy, stock prices and exchange
rates in explaining current account ﬂuctuations. While a considerable fraction of the existing
literature focuses on individual countries, I extend the analysis to a set of 17 industrialized
economies. Based on a panel VAR model using data on real GDP, consumer prices, short and
long-term interest rates, stock prices, exchange rates and the current account, I ﬁnd a small role
for monetary policy shocks. This ﬁnding does not square with the empirical evidence for the
U.S., but can be attributed to the behavior of the exchange rate, which mitigates the effects of
monetary policy shocks, in particular for small open economies.
In contrast, shocks to stock prices and exchange rates have a signiﬁcant impact on the cur-
rent account. While a 10% increase in stock prices leads to a deterioration of the current account
of 0.3%, an appreciation of the exchange rate of similar magnitude depresses the current ac-
count by 0.4%. The effect of stock price shocks on the current account builds up gradually
over time and reaches its maximum after around 9-11 quarters. Depending on the identiﬁca-
tion scheme, exchange rate shocks exert their maximal inﬂuence either after 7-11 quarters or
within two quarters after the shock. The latter response of the current account to exchange rate
shocks is hence inconsistent with the prediction of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. In
this model, the current account improves on impact following an exchange rate appreciation,
19before falling over time. Such a ’J-curve effect’ is frequently observed in single country VAR
models, but counterintuitive. Given that the panel set-up allows me to estimate the impulse
responses more precisely as compared to single country VARs, it seems plausible that the ﬁnd-
ings of the existing VAR literature are the result of overparametrized and hence imprecisely
estimated models. And ﬁnally, stock price and exchange rate shocks explain a notable fraction
of the variation of the current account at medium and long-term forecast horizons as compared
to others shocks, in particular monetary policy shocks.
The analysis suggests that stock price and exchange rate shocks are about equally important
in explaining current account ﬂuctuations. Thus I ﬁnd a channel, in addition to the traditional
exchange rate channel, through which external balance for an OECD country with a current
account imbalance can be restored. I demonstrate the economic relevance of this stock price
channel with an example. According to the numbers reported above, a stock market underper-
formance of 100% improves the current account by about 3%. Such a large underperformance is
not unusual if the country under study is in a crisis situation. Moreover, the adjustment needs
not to happen immediately but may take several years. Take Japan as an example. While the
Japanese stock market lost about half of its value during the 1990s, the U.S. market soared by
more than 400% at the same time, providing an explanation for the current account surpluses in
Japan and the deﬁcits in the United States. Thus, even for countries with large current account
deﬁcits stock price movements are a potential driver of the adjustment process.
202 Exploring the international transmission of U.S. stock
price movements
I investigate the transmission of U.S. stock price shocks to real activity and prices in G-7 coun-
tries using a multicountry vector autoregressive (VAR) model. I achieve identiﬁcation by im-
posing a small number of sign restrictions on impulse responses, while controlling for monetary
policy, business cycle and government spending shocks. The results suggest that (a) stock price
movements are important for ﬂuctuations in G-7 real activity and prices, but do not qualify as
demand side business cycle shocks, and (b) the transmission is similar across G-7 countries.
2.1 Introduction
There is an increasing number of VAR-based studies that stress the role of stock prices in ex-
plaining macroeconomic developments. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2006) argue that
shocks to stock prices reﬂect changes in agents’ expectations about future total factor produc-
tivity and are an important driver of U.S. business cycles. Fratzscher et al. (2007) point to stock
market wealth as an explanation for U.S. external imbalances, while in an extension to the G-7
countries, Fratzscher and Straub (2009) ﬁnd that shocks to stock returns have sizeable effects
on external accounts. Furthermore, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) study the rela-
tionship between stock prices, real activity and prices in industrialized countries and ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant transmission of stock price shocks to the latter.
The main challenge in identifying stock price shocks is to disentangle movements in stock
prices that are due to the business cycle or to other shocks and those that are exogenous, a
difﬁculty the existing literature largely ignores. One camp uses sign restrictions on impulse
responses and treats shocks to stock prices as demand side business cycle shocks, assuming
that stock prices impact on real actvity and prices (see, e.g., Fratzscher et al., 2007; Fratzscher
and Straub, 2009). Another camp imposes zero restrictions on impulse matrices and rules out
a contemporaneous effect of stock prices on real actvity, prices and interest rates (see, e.g.,
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2008). Both approaches are debatable. The ﬁrst one is dog-
matic regarding the nature of stock price shocks, the second imposes short-run restrictions that
are likely to be violated in reality. A counterexample is the immediate monetary policy response
to the stock market crash in October 1987.
In this chapter, I identify shocks to U.S. stock prices using a small number of sign restric-
tions on impulse responses, while controlling for monetary policy, business cycle and govern-
ment spending shocks. The approach allows me to ﬁlter out the effects of these shocks on stock
21prices and is agnostic with respect to the nature of stock price shocks. The procedure shares
similarities with the identiﬁcation scheme of Mountford and Uhlig (2005) in the context of ﬁscal
policy shocks. Furthermore, consistent with the aforementioned studies, I take an international
perspective. I use a multicountry VAR for the G-7 countries as described in Canova and Cic-
carelli (2009). The approach is novel and has been used so far to construct indicators of world
and national business cycles (see Canova et al., 2007) or to investigate the propagation of mon-
etary and technology shocks between the U.S. and the euro area (see Caivano, 2006). I prefer
the multicountry VAR to other panel data approaches since it allows for cross-country lagged
interdependencies and heterogeneous dynamics. Both features are often neglected in the liter-
ature but likely to be present in my context. Furthermore, the multicountry VAR methodology
can be applied to panel data where the cross-sectional dimension is short and the time series is
of moderate length only. In addition, a factor structure keeps estimation simple.
I ﬁnd that stock price shocks are important for ﬂuctuations in G-7 real activity and prices
even when controlling for other shocks. However, such shocks do not qualify as demand side
businesscycleshockssincetheydonotinduceapositivecomovementofrealactivityandprices.
Moreover, the transmission appears to be similar across G-7 countries.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the multicountry VAR
and the identiﬁcation strategy with sign restrictions. Section 2.3 describes the empirical imple-
mentation. In Section 2.4, I discuss the preferred speciﬁcation of the multicountry VAR and
document its empirical properties. Section 2.5 presents an impulse responses analysis. Section
2.6 presents a forecast error variance decomposition. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The multicountry VAR and identiﬁcation
2.2.1 The model
Consider the multicountry VAR:
yit =
p  
j=1
BijYt−j + ci + uit, (2.1)
where i = 1,2,...,N; t = 1,2,...,T; yit is a G×1 vector of variables for country i, Bij is a G×NG
coefﬁcient matrix for lag j, Yt = (y′
1t,y′
2t,...,y′
Nt)
′ is a NG×1 vector containing the variables for
all N countries, ci is a constant, and uit is a G × 1 vector of random disturbances.
Grouping coefﬁcients for country i yields a NGp + 1 × G matrix δi = (Bi1,Bi2,...,Bip,ci)
′.
Furthermore, let δ = vec(δ1,δ2,...,δN) be the NGk × 1 vector of all coefﬁcients, where k =
NGp + 1 is the number of coefﬁcients in each equation. In most applications, k is larger than
22the number of observations T and the multicountry VAR cannot be estimated without imposing
restrictions. I follow Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) and assume that the coefﬁcient vector can be
factored as
δ =
F  
f=1
Ξfθf, (2.2)
where F << k is the number of factors, the Ξf’s are conformable matrices and the θf’s are
factor loadings. Thus the dimensionality is reduced signiﬁcantly. Rather than a large number
of coefﬁcients, only a small number of factor loadings has to be estimated. The choice of the
factors is application and sample dependent. Factors may cover variations that are common
across countries and variables or are speciﬁc to a particular country, variable or lag. In contrast
to Canova and Ciccarelli (2009), I do not let the θ’s vary over time or allow for idiosyncratic
components.
Let Xit =
 
Y ′
t−1,Y ′
t−2,...,Y ′
t−p,1
 ′ be the k × 1 matrix of regressors for country i and deﬁne
Xt = ING ⊗ X′
it, Ξ = (Ξ1,Ξ2,...,ΞF) and θ = (θ′
1,θ′
2,...,θ′
F)
′. The multicountry VAR can be
rewritten as
Yt = Xtδ + ut
= XtΞθ + ut
= χtθ + ut, (2.3)
where χt = XtΞ and ut = (u′
1t,u′
2t,...,u′
Nt)
′.
For illustration, I consider N = G = 2, p = 1 and F = 3. Then Ξ = (Ξ1,Ξ2,Ξ3) and
θ = (θ1,θ′
2,θ′
3)
′. Here θ1 is a scalar (a common factor), θ2 = (θ21,θ22)
′ is a 2 × 1 vector of
country speciﬁc factors and θ3 = (θ31,θ32) is a 2 × 1 vector of variable speciﬁc factors. Let
i1 = (1,1,1,1,0)
′, i2 = (1,1,0,0,0)
′, i3 = (0,0,1,1,0)
′, i4 = (1,0,1,0,0)
′ and i5 = (0,1,0,1,0)
′,
then
Ξ1 =


 



i1
i1
i1
i1


 



20×1
, Ξ2 =


 



i2 i3
i2 i3
i2 i3
i2 i3


 



20×2
, Ξ3 =


 



i4 i5
i4 i5
i4 i5
i4 i5


 



20×2
, (2.4)
implying that the ﬁrst equation of the reparametrized multicountry VAR reads as
y11,t = θ1χ1t + θ21χ2t + θ22χ3t + θ31χ4t + θ32χ5t + u11,t, (2.5)
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i
 
g
 
j yig,t−j +1, χ2t =
 
g
 
j y1g,t−j, χ3t =
 
g
 
j y2g,t−j, χ4t =
 
i
 
j yi1,t−j
and χ5t =
 
i
 
j yi2,t−j.
The overparametrized multicountry VAR is transformed into a parsimonious seemingly un-
related regression (SUR) model with observable linear combinations of the right hand side vari-
ables of the VAR as regressors. χ1t contains information for all countries and variables, χ2 (χ3)
contains information speciﬁc to country 1 (2) and χ4 (χ5) contains information speciﬁc to vari-
able 1 (2). Pooling data in such a way removes both cross-section and time series noise and is
expected to lead to more stable estimates of δ. Moreover, I allow the θ’s to be different across
equations and estimate the SUR model sequentially by ordinary least squares (OLS). Finally, I
use the estimated factor loadings to recover the coefﬁcient vector δ.
2.2.2 Implementing sign restrictions
Given the dimensionality of the model, an exact identiﬁcation is not possible. But I can identify
a subset of shocks for the U.S. and study their transmission. Suppose the U.S. is ordered ﬁrst
and the reduced form errors are expressed as linear combinations of the shocks: u1t = P1ǫ1t,
with P1 being a G×G matrix and ǫ1t a G×1 vector of orthogonal shocks with covariance matrix
Σǫ1 = E (ǫ1tǫ′
1t) = IG. The model for the U.S. is thus given by
y1t =
p  
j=1
B1jYt−j + c1 + P1ǫ1t. (2.6)
The restriction on P1 so far is: Σu1 = E (u1tu′
1t) = E (P1ǫ1tǫ′
1tP′
1) = P1Σǫ1P′
1 = P1P′
1. In order
to achieve exact identiﬁcation within the U.S. model
G(G−1)
2 additional restrictions have to be
imposed on P1. A frequently used strategy is to assume a recursive ordering of the variables in
y1t, thus demanding P1 to be lower triangular. This can be achieved by means of a Cholesky
decomposition of Σu1.
I follow a different approach and identify shocks by imposing restrictions on the sign of
impulse responses. This approachis developed inter aliaby Faust (1998), CanovaandDe Nicoló
(2002), Uhlig (2005) and Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2005) and is motivated as follows. Suppose there
does exist an orthonormal G × G matrix Q such that QQ′ = Q′Q = I. Then u1t = P1QQ′ǫ1t
is an admissible decomposition and ǫ⋆
1t = Q′ǫ1t is a new set of shocks with the property that
Σǫ⋆
1 = E
 
ǫ⋆
1tǫ⋆′
1t
 
= E (Q′ǫ1tǫ′
1tQ) = I. Thus, ǫ⋆
1t has the same covariance matrix as ǫ1t but is
associated with a different impulse matrix P⋆
1 = P1Q. This ability to create a large number of
candidate impulses makes the sign restriction approach advantageous compared to recursive
identiﬁcation schemes. In recursive systems the number of possible factorizations is quickly
24exhausted and the factorization that produces responses that are consistent with a priori beliefs
is chosen. But in many cases counterintuitive results cannot be avoided. The ’price puzzle’ is
an example. However, the sign restrictions approach allows me to consider a large number of
decompositions and to avoid counterintuitive results. And instead of imposing informal short-
run restrictions, I explicitly state which restrictions I use.
I apply the following algorithm. First, I calculate a lower triangular factor of Σu1, labeled
P1, using a Cholesky decomposition. The results, however, are invariant to the ordering of the
variables as Uhlig (2005) shows. The Cholesky decomposition is only a computational tool and
I could alternatively use an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of Σu1. Second, I draw a
G × G random matrix W from a multivariate standard normal distribution and apply the QR
decomposition to W, such that W = QR and QQ′ = Q′Q = I. Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2005) show
that this Q matrix has the required uniform distribution. Third, I construct an impulse matrix
P1Q and calculate the associated responses. If all the restrictions are fulﬁlled, I keep the draw.
Otherwise, I discard it. I consider a large number of candidate Q’s and draw inference from
those draws that are kept.
This strategy allows me to identify up to G shocks for the United States. Moreover, I let
the remaining variables react according to a transformed covariance matrix. I transform Σu =
E (utu′
t) in such a way that the identiﬁcation of U.S. shocks is invariant to the ordering of the
countries and variables in the model. Dees et al. (2007) apply a similar transformation in the
context of a Global VAR. I provide details in Appendix B.1.
2.3 The empirical setup
I estimate the multicountry VAR on quarterly data for the years 1974-2005, covering a period of
largely ﬂexible exchange rates and rising ﬁnancial globalization. The estimation period is lim-
ited by the availability of ﬁscal data. I provide a summary of the data sources in Appendix B.2.
I include nine variables for each of the G-7 countries: the government budget (primary balance
in percent of GDP), real government spending (real government consumption plus investment),
real GDP, real private consumption, real private investment, the GDP deﬂator, a nominal short-
term interest rate, a monetary aggregate, and nominal stock prices. I consider the government
budget and real government spending to identify government spending shocks, while I use in-
terest rates and monetary aggregates to identify monetary policy shocks. Moreover, real GDP,
real private consumption, real private investment, the GDP deﬂator and nominal stock prices
are the variables of interest.
25Table 2.1: Sign restrictions on impulse responses
Contractionary shocks to
U.S. Mon. Policy U.S. Business Cycle U.S. Stock Prices U.S. Gov. Spend.
Gov. Budget − +
Gov. Spend. −
GDP −
Consumption −
Investment −
GDP Deﬂator −
Money (M1) −
Interest Rate +
Stock Prices −
Notes: The horizon is four quarters.
Government budget outcomes and interest rates enter the model in levels, but I consider
the remaining variables in annualized quarterly growth rates, even though this may result in
a slight misspeciﬁcation of the model since I cannot exploit the informational content of coin-
tegrating relationships in this case. But I want to ensure that all variables are expressed in the
same unit of measurement, i.e. in percent, and that their variability is comparable before I con-
struct averages. Otherwise averages could be dominated by a particular variable. Therefore,
I normalize all series by substracting the mean and by dividing by their respective standard
deviation. Finally, I set the lag length to two. Since in the SUR model regressors are averages
over the lags of the variables, the results are robust to variations in the lag length.
Table 2.1 summarizes the sign restrictions. I impose restrictions for four quarters on the
level of U.S. variables. I consider a horizon of one year to avoid only transitory movements
in variables and thus spurious identiﬁcation of shocks. Moreover, the horizon is consistent
with related studies (see, e.g. Mountford and Uhlig, 2005; Scholl and Uhlig, 2008; Peersman
and Straub, 2009, among others). Furthermore, I require that all the restrictions are satisﬁed
simultaneously. This ensures orthogonality of shocks and allows me to ﬁlter out the effects of
monetary policy, business cycle and government spending shocks on stock prices.
Monetarypolicyshocksraiseinterestrates, whilemonetaryaggregatesandtheGDPdeﬂator
fall. Hence, I avoid ’price or liquidity puzzles’ by construction. Contractionary business cycle
shocks depress real GDP, real private consumption and real private investment. I impose no
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Figure 2.1: World and country indicators
restriction on the response of the GDP deﬂator and thus control for both supply and demand
side shocks. But I require that the government budget deteriorates in response to contractionary
business cycle shocks since important budget components, such as tax revenues or transfer
payments, are heavily inﬂuenced by the state of the economy. Shocks to stock prices contract
stock prices, while I do not restrict the response of any other variable. Thus, I am agnostic about
the nature of such shocks. This distincts the approach from those in the related literature. I test
the hypothesis that stock price shocks impact on real activity and the GDP deﬂator rather than
assuming it. Finally, government spending shocks lower government spending and improve
the government budget, assuming that the ﬁscal authority does not fully compensate for the
reduction in spending by lowering taxes or increasing transfer payments.
2.4 International comovements of the variables
Before presenting impulse responses and a forecast error variance decomposition in the next
two sections, I explore the country and variable-speciﬁc factor or indicator series. Given that
the multicountry VAR methodology is novel and only few applications are available, it seems
appropriateto checkfor its plausibility. Moreover, I wanttoinvestigate whetherall theindicator
27Table 2.2: Correlation between the world and country indicators
World U.S. Canada Germany France UK Italy Japan
World 1.00
U.S. 0.69 1.00
Canada 0.65 0.44 1.00
Germany 0.53 0.27 0.02 1.00
France 0.86 0.52 0.51 0.33 1.00
UK 0.76 0.39 0.57 0.28 0.66 1.00
Italy 0.78 0.58 0.43 0.32 0.71 0.46 1.00
Japan 0.68 0.26 0.25 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.36 1.00
series are necessary to model the data. Since the series are correlated by construction, it seems
likely that I can leave out some when estimating the model.
Figure 2.1 shows the world and country indicators. The country indicators average across
variables and lags and mirror important episodes for the countries under study. For example,
the troughs in the U.S. indicator series coincide with the recessions that hit the U.S. during the
sample period: one in the mid 1970s, the double dip recession in the early 1980s, the recession
in 1991, and ﬁnally that of 2001. Moreover, the peak in the German indicator in the early 1990s
marks the reuniﬁcation boom, while the collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1992 is particularly evident for the UK and Italy. Furthermore, the weak economic performance
in Japan during the 1990s which was accompanied by deﬂationary pressures results in a sub-
stantial decline of the indicator over this period.
Though some of these events are speciﬁc to a country or region, a casual comparison of the
plots leads me to conclude that the indicators share similarities. This is conﬁrmed by Table 2.2
which shows evidence of a positive comovement of the country indicators. Not surprisingly,
they also tend to comove positively with the world indicator suggesting that country-speciﬁc
events are of temporary importance.
Figure 2.2 shows the variable indicators which average across countries and lags. Some no-
table developments are readily apparent. The GDP and investment series, and to a lesser extent
consumption, track the severe contractions in the mid 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. recessions
in 1991 and 2001, and the European one in 1992. The indicator series for the GDP deﬂator and
interest rates decline over time, reﬂecting global disinﬂation. The series for government spend-
ing appears to be stable over time, except for the mid 1990s when government spending is weak
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Figure 2.2: Variable indicators
for a couple of years and government budgets experienced rapid improvements, probably the
result of ﬁscal consolidation in Europe following the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Moreover, mon-
etary aggregates decline steadily until the mid 1990s but rise thereafter. Finally, stock prices
appear to be noisy even after taking averages across countries and time. The years 1974 (ﬁrst oil
shock), 1987 (stock market crash) and 2001 (U.S. recession) are associated with negative returns.
I report the correlation between the variable indicators in Table 2.3. Overall, correlations are
lower for variable than for country indicators. A few exceptions are worth mentioning. GDP,
consumption and investment show a positive comovement. Furthermore, the GDP deﬂator and
interest rates tend to be positively correlated as well, while the government budget and the GDP
deﬂator display a negative correlation.
I conclude, while it is desirable to have all of the variable indicators in the model, there is
probably no need to include the full set of country indicators once the world indicator has been
addedtothemodel. Abulkofthevariationinthedatacanpresumablybeexplainedbycommon
movements and adding country indicators leads to multicollinearity. Thus, I do not consider a
speciﬁcation where all are included but experiment with the following possibilties. First, I run
regressions for each of the 63 series and include a world, nine variable but no country indicator.
Second, I perform the same regressions but add an U.S. country indicator for all countries since
29Table 2.3: Correlation between the variable indicators
Gov. Gov. GDP Cons. Invest. GDP Money Int. Stock
Budget Spend. Deﬂ. (M1) Rate Prices
Gov. Budget 1.00
Gov. Spending−0.03 1.00
GDP 0.15 −0.04 1.00
Consumption 0.09 0.19 0.77 1.00
Investment 0.30 −0.17 0.85 0.65 1.00
GDP Deﬂator −0.47 0.40 −0.09 −0.03 −0.29 1.00
Money (M1) −0.35 0.52 0.06 0.28 −0.01 0.41 1.00
Interest Rate −0.27 0.25 −0.14 −0.15 −0.31 0.74 −0.01 1.00
Stock Prices −0.06 −0.16 0.20 0.31 0.26 −0.07 0.16 0.00 1.00
the U.S. was the single largest member of the world economy during the sample period. Third,
I replace the U.S. by a country indicator for the same country as the left hand side variable.
Table 2.4 reports the average fraction of the variance that is explained by the respective set
of indicators, i.e. the average R2. The upper panel shows the average across all countries and
variables, the middle panel reports for each country the average across variables and the lower
panel for each variable the average across countries. Several ﬁndings are of interest. First,
about 40% of the variance across variables and countries is explained by the indicators. Second,
the average R2 is similar across countries, but not across variables. While movements in some
variables are explained well (government budget, GDP deﬂator and interest rates), those in oth-
ers are not (particularly stock prices), reﬂecting different degrees of persistence. Third, adding
country indicators to the model raises the R2 by little. Consequently, I feel comfortable with the
idea not to add all of the country indicators. However, I prefer to have the own country indica-
tor included since it allows me to discriminate between developments speciﬁc to a country and
those to the world.
2.5 Impulse responses
In this section, I present the impulse responses following shocks to U.S. monetary policy, the
business cycle, stock prices and government spending. I estimate the multicountry VAR, ﬁx
coefﬁcients at their OLS point estimates and draw one million Q matrices, leaving me with 289
responses that are consistent with the set of identifying restrictions. The acceptance ratio is low
30Table 2.4: Average R2 for regression of variables on indicator series
Own Country Indicator U.S. Country Indicator No Country Indicator
All 0.40 0.40 0.39
U.S. 0.43 0.43 0.42
Canada 0.43 0.42 0.41
Germany 0.31 0.30 0.30
France 0.45 0.45 0.44
UK 0.38 0.39 0.37
Italy 0.46 0.46 0.45
Japan 0.36 0.35 0.34
Gov. Budget 0.81 0.79 0.77
Gov. Spending 0.21 0.21 0.20
GDP 0.27 0.28 0.26
Consumption 0.15 0.15 0.14
Investment 0.26 0.26 0.25
GDP Deﬂator 0.69 0.70 0.68
Money (M1) 0.25 0.25 0.24
Interest Rate 0.88 0.88 0.87
Stock Prices 0.10 0.11 0.10
Notes: Table shows the average fraction of the variance that is explained by the indicator series, i.e. the
average R2. The upper panel reports the averages across all countries and variables, the middle panel
shows for each country the averages across variables and the lower panel for each variable the averages
across countries. ’No Country Indicator’ means that each variable is regressed on a world, all variable
but not on a country indicator. ’U.S. Country Indicator’ indicates that the U.S. country indicator is
included in all regressions. ’Own Country Indicator’ means that the country indicator added to the right
hand side of the regression refers to the same country as the left hand side variable.
compared to related studies for two reasons. First, I identify four shocks simultaneously. And
second, identiﬁcation in a multicountry VAR is more difﬁcult than in a standard VAR.
A common practice is to report the median of the posterior distribution, often in combi-
nation with percentile bands providing a measure of the range of responses. However, the
distribution is across models and the median is not generated by a single model, i.e. by a single
Q matrix. Thus, draws from the posterior distribution are not orthogonal, which is particularly
problematic if multiple shocks are identiﬁed. In order to overcome this problem, I follow Fry
and Pagan (2007) and choose a Q matrix that produces responses, which are as close as possible
to the median. This preserves the consensus view that the median is an informative statistic,
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Figure 2.3: Estimated multicountry VAR shocks
Notes: Entries are percent.
while orthogonality is retained. I normalize all responses by dividing by the standard deviation
across all accepted draws and choose that Q, which minimizes the sum of squared deviations
from the median over all accepted draws, variables and time horizons:
Q⋆
s = argmin
4  
i=1
63  
j=1
24  
k=0
 
φijk (Qs) − med(φijk)
std(φijk)
 2
(2.7)
where φijk (Qs) is the response of variable j = 1,...,63 to shock i = 1,...,4 at horizon k = 0,...,24
generated by model s = 1,...,289.
The set of admissible models is thus reduced from 289 to 1 and I construct impulse responses
and multicountry VAR shocks (this section) as well as a forecast error variance decomposition
(next section) on the basis of the selected model. In order to summarize the information, I
average statistics for Canada, Germany, France, UK, Italy and Japan and present results for this
panel of countries and the United States.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shock for the United States
Notes: Entries are deviations from baseline in percent; horizontal axis denotes quarters after the shock.
2.5.1 U.S. monetary policy shocks
I show the estimated U.S. monetary policy shocks in the ﬁrst panel of Figure 2.3. The stance of
monetary policy in the United States is loose in the mid and late 1970s, but tight around 1980
following the appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Moreover, the
series displays negative innovations in 1987 and 2001, indicating an accomodative role of U.S.
monetary policy in response to the U.S. stock market crash and the terrorist attacks on 9/11,
respectively. Furthermore, the unexpected tightening around 1994-95 coincides with U.S. bond
market turbulences. Overall, the estimated shocks mirror important U.S. monetary episodes,
suggesting that the series is plausible.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the impulse responses following a shock to U.S. monetary policy
for the United States and the panel of other G-7 countries, respectively. I report the responses at
each horizon between 0 and 24 quarters after the shock. Consider ﬁrst the transmission within
the United States. By construction, the shock has a positive effect on the interest rate, but a
negative impact on the monetary aggregate and the GDP deﬂator for a year throughout. As a
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shock for the other G-7 countries
Notes: See Figure 2.4
consequence, real consumption and real investment contract on impact and are below their ini-
tial level for most of the following six years. Similarly, real GDP falls after the monetary policy
shock, but displays a less intuitive postive response in the short-run. Surprisingly, the govern-
ment budget improves in the years after the shock even though real activity is contracting. I
presume that U.S. monetary and ﬁscal policy were somewhat coordinated over the sample pe-
riod and that the monetary tightening is accompanied by an increase in taxes. Furthermore,
stock prices rise in response to the monetary policy shock which is counterintuitive. However,
I simultaneously identify an orthogonal shock that depresses stock prices for four quarters by
construction and hence stock prices have the tendency to rise in response to other shocks. Over-
all, the responses settle around zero within a reasonable period of time, suggesting that the
model is stable.
With respect to the transmission to the panel of other G-7 countries, I ﬁnd that the U.S. mon-
etary policy shock produces foreign responses that are similar to those for the United States.
The main differences are in the effects on interest rates and government spending. While U.S.
interest rates rise on impact and decline steadily thereafter, the positive effect on foreign inter-
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to U.S. business cycle shock for the United States
Notes: See Figure 2.4
est rates builds up gradually over time, resulting in a hump-shaped response. Moreover, U.S
government spending increases after the U.S. monetary policy shock, but foreign government
spending is below its initial level for about a year after the shock.
2.5.2 U.S. business cycle shocks
The second panel of Figure 2.3 shows the estimated U.S. business cycle shocks. Negative inno-
vations coincide with the 1973-75 and 1980 NBER recession dates, while that of 1981-82 is not
picked up. Moreover, the contraction of 1990-91 is apparent, but the mild recession of 2001 is
not different from other shocks. Furthermore, the series shows a number of positive innovations
in the early and mid 1980s and late 1990s, reﬂecting the recovery after the double dip recession
and the ’new economy boom’, respectively. In addition, the business cycle series is less volatile
after 1985, consistent with the idea of a ’great moderation’. In sum, the estimated series is a
plausible description of the cyclical behavior of the U.S. economy over the sample period.
I show the impulse responses to a contractionary U.S. business cycle shock for the United
States in Figure 2.6. By construction, real GDP, real consumption and real investment fall after
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to U.S. business cycle shock for the other G-7 countries
Notes: See Figure 2.4
the shock and the government budget deteriorates. The effect on the budget, but not on real
activity, is persistent even after removing the restriction. Fiscal balance is restored not until
three years after the shock. However, real activity variables are expressed in quarterly growth
rates and not in levels, hence it is not surprising that their responses return to their initial level
soon after removing the restriction.
What are those shocks? So far, business cycle shocks induce a positive comovement of real
activity and the government budget, while I impose no restriction on the response of the GDP
deﬂator, consistent with both supply and demand side shocks. Thus, the response of the GDP
deﬂator provides an answer. As you can see, real activity and the GDP deﬂator are negatively
correlated for years after the shock, suggesting that the shock is a supply side shock. Possible
candidates are technology or oil price shocks. However, I am not interested in the exact nature
of such shocks since the main purpose of identifying business cycle shocks is to control for their
effect on stock prices.
In fact, stock prices are adversely affected by the contractionary business cycle shock on
impact. However, they recover soon after. Most of the adjustment takes place within a few
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to U.S. stock price shock for the United States
Notes: See Figure 2.4
quarters, consistent with the idea that stock prices incorporate news on the state of the business
cycle in a short period of time. Furthermore, government spending and interest rates fall after
the shock, suggesting an accomodative role for U.S. monetary policy, but not U.S. ﬁscal policy,
in dealing with the contraction in real activity.
Finally, we can see from Figure 2.7 that the U.S. business cycle shock induces adjustments
within the other G-7 countries that are similar to those for the United States. Though foreign
real activity variables display slightly delayed responses, the results support the view that real
activityacrossG-7countriesishighlysynchronized(see, e.g.,Canovaetal.,2007, amongothers).
2.5.3 U.S. stock price shocks
I show the estimated U.S. stock price shocks in the third panel of Figure 2.3. The series is volatile
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and less volatile during the pronounced bull market 1982-
2000. In particular, the 1995-2000 stock market boom is associated with a decline in volatility,
consistent with the idea that stock returns and volatility are negatively correlated. Furthermore,
the series displays negative innovations to U.S. stock prices in 1987 (the U.S. stock market crash)
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to U.S. stock price shock for the other G-7 countries
Notes: See Figure 2.4
and 2001-03 (the U.S. bear market). In sum, the estimated shocks reﬂect important U.S. stock
market events and appear to be plausible.
Figure 2.8 shows the impulse responses to an U.S. stock price shock for the United States.
The stock price shock is orthogonal to the monetary policy shock, the business cycle shock and
the government spending shock and stock prices decline for a year. However, I do not restrict
the response of any other variable. As you can see from Figure 2.8, the response for stock
prices immediately returns to zero once I remove the restriction, reﬂecting the low persistence
of stock returns. Furthermore, the shock has a clear implication for the GDP deﬂator. The GDP
deﬂator falls on impact and is below its initial level for the following six years. In contrast,
I do not obtain a clear-cut result regarding the effect on real activity. While real investment
falls on impact, real GDP and real consumption display positive responses. Thereafter, all three
variablescontractforafewquartersbeforereturningtotheirinitiallevel. Apossibleexplanation
for the improvement of real GDP in the short-run is that both U.S. monetary and ﬁscal policy are
accomodative in response to the stock price shock. Government spending increases on impact,
while the government budget and interest rates are both falling over time.
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses to U.S. government spending shock for the United States
Notes: See Figure 2.4
I conclude that the U.S. stock price shock does not qualify as a demand side business cycle
shock as often argued in the literature (see, e.g., Fratzscher et al., 2007, among others). There
is at best weak evidence of a positive comovement of stock prices, real GDP, real consumption,
real investment and the GDP deﬂator. Given that the business cyle shock of the previous sec-
tion turns out to be a supply side shock, a positive comovement would be possible even when
requiring orthogonaliy between stock price and business cycle shocks.
Are the sign restrictions confusing shocks? Seems unlikely since I control for monetary
policy, business cycle and government spending shocks when identifying shocks to stock prices.
Of course, there are other candidates that may be relevant in this context, such as investment-
efﬁcieny shocks. As for the stock price shock in Figure 2.8, investment-efﬁciency shocks lead to
a negative correlation between consumption and investment. However, investment-efﬁciency
shocks are also associated with a positive correlation between real GDP and investment, which
is not the case for the stock price shock. Thus, it seems unlikely that the stock price shock is an
investment-efﬁciency shock.
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Figure 2.11: Impulse responses to U.S. government spending shock for the other G-7
countries
Notes: See Figure 2.4
As you can see from Figure 2.9, the U.S. stock price shock produces responses for the other
G-7 countries that are similar to those for the United States. In particular, the shock is instanta-
neously incorporated in foreign stock prices, reﬂecting the close linkages between international
stock markets. However, it seems that the negative effect of the decline in stock prices on real
activity is larger over the medium-term for the other G-7 countries as compared to the United
States.
2.5.4 U.S. government spending shocks
I show the estimated U.S. government spending shocks in the last panel of Figure 2.3. Overall,
breaks in the series appear to be correlated with changes in the presidential terms. The esti-
mated government spending shocks are negative on average in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
indicating a restrictive ﬁscal policy during the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. In
contrast, the Reagan era 1981-89 is associated with a series of positive shocks. In particular, U.S.
ﬁscal policy is expansionary at the beginning of his second term in 1985, thanks to tax reduc-
40tions and increased military defense spending. However, U.S. ﬁscal policy becomes restrictive
after the election in 1989 and the presidencies of George Bush senior and Bill Clinton coincide
with a number of negative shocks. Finally, the series is volatile during the ﬁrst term of George
Bush junior 2001-05, while the peaks in 2001 and 2003 indicate the military build ups associated
with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Of course, I cannot rule out that some of
the estimated shocks reﬂect permanent changes in the conduct of U.S. ﬁscal policy rather than
unsystematic ﬂuctuations.
Figure 2.10 shows the impulse responses to an U.S. government spending shock for the
United States. Such a shock reduces real government spending for one year while the govern-
ment budget is restricted to improve. It also reduces real GDP and real consumption. Both
variables fall on impact and are below their initial level for the following six years. In contrast,
real investment rises on impact before falling over time, consistent with the textbook view of a
crowding-in effect of the ﬁscal tightening. The positive effect on real investment seems to come
from a reduction in real interest rates. Though both the interest rate and the GDP deﬂator rise
after the shock, the GDP deﬂator increases stronger, suggesting a fall in real interest rates. The
negative correlation between real government spending on the one hand and the GDP deﬂa-
tor as well as the interest rate on the other hand is less intuitive. However, such a ﬁnding is
not uncommon in the ﬁscal policy literature (see, e.g., Mountford and Uhlig, 2005, among oth-
ers). Finally, stock prices fall on impact, reﬂecting the contraction in real activity but recover
thereafter.
I end this section by presenting the impulse responses for the other G-7 countries in Figure
2.11. It appears that the U.S. government spending shock is not directly transmitted to foreign
ﬁscal policy variables. Both government spending and the budget display responses that are
different to those of their U.S. counterparts. While the government budget has the tendency to
fall rather than to improve over time, government spending is above its initial level after a year.
However, the remaining variables follow their U.S. counterparts closely. Thus, the U.S. govern-
ment spending shock contracts foreign real GDP and real consumption over the medium-term,
while real investment is crowded in on impact, but falls thereafter. In addition, foreign interest
rates and the GDP deﬂator increase.
2.6 Forecast error variance decomposition
In this section, I present a forecast error variance decomposition and assess how much of the
variation in the variables can be accounted for by shocks to U.S. stock prices as compared to
monetary policy, business cycle and government spending shocks. I report the numbers for the
41Table 2.5: Forecast error variance decomposition for the United States
Variability due to shock to
U.S. Mon. Policy U.S. Business Cycle U.S. Stock Prices U.S. Gov. Spend.
Gov. Budget 4 43 6 47
Gov. Spending 46 35 4 16
GDP 1 57 40 2
Consumption 4 85 10 1
Investment 6 76 9 9
GDP Deﬂator 12 11 10 66
Money (M1) 32 4 12 52
Interest Rate 13 40 33 14
Stock Prices 49 27 23 1
Notes: I show the contribution in percent after 24 quarters.
United States in Table 2.5 and those for the panel of other G-7 countries in Table 2.6. Both ta-
bles show the variance shares at forecast horizons of 24 quarters. I consider long-term forecast
horizons for two reasons. First, the identiﬁcation uncertainty is large at the short-end and not
all of the variables display on-impact responses that are plausible. Calculating variance shares
at long-term forecast horizons avoids that the results are dominated by potentially implausible
short-term forecasts. Second, I am interested in the long-term predictive ability of stock price
shocks for ﬂuctuations in real activity variables and the GDP deﬂator rather than in their role
at business cycle frequencies. Furthermore, I do not compute the total variance of the 24-step
ahead forecast error but only that part which is explained by the four shocks. Given the dimen-
sionality of the model, this seems reasonable. Consequently, the variance shares exactly sum to
100 percent even though the model is only partially identiﬁed.
With respect to the United States, I ﬁnd that government spending and monetary policy
shocks have no explanatory power for movements in real GDP, real consumption and real in-
vestment. Both shocks explain less than 10% of the variation in real activity at a 6-year horizon.
Thus, monetary policy shocks have either little real effects in the long-run or their size is too
small to be important in relation to other shocks. In contrast, monetary policy shocks have large
effects on the monetary aggregate, stock prices and government spending, while government
spending shocks account for a substantial fraction of the variation in the GDP deﬂator and the
monetary aggregate. But given that government spending shocks explain 66% of the variation
42Table 2.6: Forecast error variance decomposition for the other G-7 countries
Variability due to shock to
U.S. Mon. Policy U.S. Business Cycle U.S. Stock Prices U.S. Gov. Spend.
Gov. Budget 15 51 15 19
Gov. Spending 23 44 25 8
GDP 7 63 12 17
Consumption 8 48 13 31
Investment 9 62 16 14
GDP Deﬂator 22 28 21 29
Money (M1) 27 32 22 19
Interest Rate 9 42 36 13
Stock Prices 43 34 21 2
Notes: I show the contribution in percent after 24 quarters.
in the GDP deﬂator and monetary policy shocks account for 46% of the variation in government
spending, it seems likely that the identiﬁcation scheme cannot exactly disentangle both shocks.
As already mentioned, a possible explanation is that U.S. monetary and ﬁscal policy were coor-
dinated over the sample period. However, I am not too concerned about this drawback since
I am not interested in monetary policy and government spending shocks per se but consider
them to ﬁlter out their impact on stock prices.
Not surprisingly, U.S. business cycle shocks explain the largest fraction of the variation in
real GDP, real consumption and real investment. Between 57% and 85% of the variation in real
activityisduetosuchshocks. Moreover, abouthalfofthemovementsinthegovernmentbudget
are explained by changes in the business cycle and the other half by exogenous innovations to
ﬁscal policy. In addition, business cycle shocks account for 40% of the variation in the interest
rate, supporting the view that the largest fraction of the variation in interest rates is due to the
endogenous part of monetary policy, i.e. the systematic response to shocks other than monetary
policy shocks.
How much of the variation in U.S. variables cannot be attributed to shocks to U.S monetary
policy, the business cycle and government spending and is thus due to U.S. stock price shocks?
As you can see, only 23% of the variation in stock prices is due to own innovations, supporting
my idea that controlling for other shocks is important when studying the transmission of stock
price movements. Moreover, about one third of the variation in the interest rate, but less than
4310% of the variation in government spending and the budget is due to stock price shocks, sug-
gesting an active role for the monetary authority, but not ﬁscal authority, in dealing with stock
price movements. The effects of U.S. stock price shocks on real activity and the GDP deﬂator are
less clear-cut. While stock price shocks explain 40% of the variation in real GDP, their impact on
real consumption, real investment and the GDP deﬂator is small. Given that real consumption
and real investment make up a large fraction of real GDP, the impact of stock price shocks on
real GDP must hence come from elsewhere, presumably through the trade balance.
With respect to the transmission of U.S. shocks to other G-7 countries, I ﬁnd that U.S. busi-
ness cycle shocks account for the largest fraction of the variation across all foreign variables.
Business cycle shocks explain between 28% of the variation in case of the GDP deﬂator and
63% for real GDP, reﬂecting an international business cycle. Since U.S. monetary policy shocks
have little effects on U.S. real activity, it is not surprising that their impact on foreign real actvity
is small, explaining less than 10% of the variation in foreign real GDP, real consumption and
real investment. In contrast, about a quarter of the variation in the GDP deﬂator and mone-
tary aggregates and nearly half of the variation in foreign stock prices is due to U.S. monetary
policy shocks. The latter result suggests that U.S. monetary policy is an important factor for
movements in international stock prices.
Furthermore, I do not obtain evidence of a ﬁscal policy coordination among G-7 countries.
U.S. government spending shocks account for a mere 8% of the variation in foreign government
spending at a 6-year forecast horizon. Moreover, their effect on foreign government budgets is
moderate, explaining less than 20% of the variation. Of course, I cannot rule out some degree
of policy coordination at short-term horizons or over the business cycle.
Overall, U.S. stock price shocks have a moderate impact on foreign variables, explaining
between 13% and 36% of the variation. Consistent with the ﬁndings for the United States, only
21% of the variation in foreing stock prices is due to U.S. stock price shocks, U.S. monetary
policy and business cycle shocks are more relevant. Moreover, I ﬁnd that 36% of the variation
in foreign interest rates is explained by U.S. stock price shocks. As for the United States, this
number suggests a strong response of monetary policy to stock price movements. In addition,
I obtain evidence of a notable effect of U.S. stock price shocks on foreign government spending
and the budget, suggesting a more active role for ﬁscal policy in the other G-7 countries in
dealing with stock price movements as compared to the United States. Finally, U.S. stock price
shocks explain between 12% and 16% of the variation in foreign real activity, while 21% of the
variation in the GDP deﬂator are due to such shocks. These numbers are larger than those for
U.S. monetary policy shocks, but smaller than for U.S. business cycle shocks.
442.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the transmission of U.S. stock price movements to real activity and prices
in G-7 countries in the period 1974-2005. I achieve identiﬁcation by imposing a small number
of sign restrictions on impulse responses, while controlling for monetary policy, business cycle
and government spending shocks. In contrast to related studies, the approach does neither rely
on potentially implausible short-run restrictions nor is it dogmatic with respect to the nature of
stock price shocks. The chapter is an application of the novel multicountry VAR methodology
of Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). I prefer the multicountry VAR to conventional panel data ap-
proaches since it has a number of appealing features. Among others, it allows for cross-country
lagged interdependencies, heterogeneous dynamics and time series of moderate length.
The results are as follows. U.S. stock price movements are important for ﬂuctuations in
G-7 real activity and prices, even when controlling for others shocks. They explain between
9% and 40% of the variation in real activity for the United States and 12% to 16% for the other
G-7 countries. Moreover, between 10% and 21% of the variation in the GDP deﬂator across
G-7 countries is due to such shocks. However, these numbers are smaller than those for U.S.
business cycle shocks. This ﬁnding, together with the observation that stock price shocks do not
induce a positive comovement of real activity and prices, leads me to conclude that shocks to
stockpricesdonotqualifyasdemandsidebusinesscycleshocks. Furthermore, thetransmission
of U.S. monetary policy, business cycle, stock price and government spending shocks is similar
across the United States and the other G-7 countries.
Finally, I want to acknowledge a limitation and point to a direction for future research. In
this paper, I leave the responses of many variables agnostically open and use the rule of Fry
and Pagan (2007) to narrow down the set of admissible models. Alternatively, I could combine
the sign restrictions with bounds restrictions on the magnitude of certain elasticities, such as
the government spending multiplier. Kilian and Murphy (2009) propose such a procedure in
the context of oil market VARs to reduce the number of models. I would expect that imposing
additional restrictions reduces the overall identiﬁcation uncertainty and the number of counter-
intuitive on-impact responses.
453 Do monetary and technology shocks move euro area
stock prices?
I use a Bayesian vector autoregressive (VAR) model to investigate the impact of monetary and
technology shocks on the euro area stock market in 1987-2005. I ﬁnd an important role for
technology shocks, but not monetary shocks, in explaining variations in real stock prices. The
identiﬁcation method is ﬂexible enough to study the effects of technology news shocks. The
responses are consistent with the idea that news on technology improvements have an imme-
diate impact on stock prices. These ﬁndings are robust to several modelling choices, including
the productivity measure, omitted variables, and the identifying restrictions.
3.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to understand the underlying sources of movements in the euro
area stock market. I address this issue by estimating a Bayesian VAR model on 1987-2005 data.
The sample period covers the 1995-2003 episode when the stock market experienced a pro-
nounced boom-bust cycle (see Figure 3.1). Stock prices tripled between 1995 and 2000, showing
double-digit returns each year. The boom ended in early 2000 and stock prices declined there-
after by 60% until 2003.
Within the VAR framework, I consider monetary and technology shocks as underlying dis-
turbances. I ﬁnd an important role for technology shocks, but not monetary shocks, in explain-
ing variations in real stock prices. Over the sample period, more than 22% of the variation in
stock prices can be attributed to technology shocks while monetary shocks explain less than 5%.
Moreover, technology shocks are responsible for almost all variation in stock prices during the
boom-bust cycle of 1995-2003. In addition, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant response of stock prices to tech-
nology news shocks. Finally, I show that these ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of additional
disturbances, such as government spending or oil price shocks.
To identify monetary and technology shocks, I use sign restrictions on impulse responses as
in Canova and De Nicoló (2002) or Uhlig (2005). I prefer this approach to the long-run restric-
tion method of Galí (1999), which builds on the assumption that technology shocks are the only
source of long-run variations in productivity. First, Uhlig (2004) convincingly argues that there
exist other shocks that may inﬂuence productivity in the long-run, such as permanent changes
in capital income taxation or social attitudes to the workplace. And second, the sign restriction
method is ﬂexible enough to study the effects of technology news shocks on stock prices. Tech-
nology news shocks have only a delayed impact on productivity and are identiﬁed by Beaudry
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Figure 3.1: Euro area stock market data
Notes: All entries are log levels (upper panel) or percent (lower panel).
and Portier (2006) as being an important determinant of U.S. stock price movements. Further-
more, I can incorporate additional short or long-run restrictions into the framework.
Following Beaudry and Portier (2006), I interpret technology shocks as being the exogenous
component of total factor productivity (hereafter ’productivity’). Technology improvements
either raise productivity immediately or with a lag of a few quarters. This delayed impact is
motivated by technology diffusion models, in which ﬁrms need some time to adjust productive
capacity, i.e. have to hire skilled workers and buy new machines. The most important aspect
in such models is that the new technological opportunities are anticipated by economic agents
and immediately incorporated into forward looking variables, in particular stock prices. This
results from the assumption that the current stock market value equals the discounted stream
of expected ﬁrm proﬁts which in turn are a function of future production possibilities.
I incorporate monetary shocks into the analysis since it is not a priori clear to me why they
should not have effects on real stock prices. Monetary shocks are changes in the stance of mone-
tary policy that cannot be explained by a policy rule, i.e. the endogenous response of the policy
interest rate to movements in real activity and inﬂation. Examples include the response to the
47stock market crash in 1987, the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge funds or
the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Given the evidence of the monetary VAR literature that monetary
disturbances inﬂuence the business cycle, they may have (temporary) effects on the discount
factor or ﬁrm proﬁts, and hence on the stock market. Moreover, the stock market boom of 1995-
2000 was accompanied by falling nominal and real interest rates, raising the question if loose
monetary policy has contributed to a stock market bubble. In addition, the end of the boom in
2000 coincided with a monetary tightening.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the Bayesian VAR and
the identiﬁcation strategy with sign restrictions. Section 3.3 reports the results, including an
impulse response analysis and a forecast error variance as well as a historical decomposition.
Moreover, I assess the plausibility of the estimated shocks and provide robustness checks. Fi-
nally, Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The empirical setup
3.2.1 Bayesian VAR model
A VAR is given by
Yt = A1Yt−1 + ... + ApYt−p + ut, (3.1)
where Yt is a G × 1 vector of variables, Ai is a G × G coefﬁcient matrix for lags i = 1,...,p, ut
is a G × 1 vector of residuals with covariance matrix Σ, and data are available for t = 1,...,T.
Given the vector of structural shocks ǫt, the residual vector can be written as ut = Bǫt, where
E [ǫtǫ′
t] = I and thus Σ = E [utu′
t] = BB′.
The vector Yt contains an index for total factor productivity (tfpt), real GDP in per capita
terms (yt), the GDP deﬂator (pt), a nominal short-term interest rate (it), a monetary aggregate
(mt), and real stock prices in per capita terms (st). I consider all variables in log levels, except the
interest rate, which is expressed in percent. By doing the analysis in levels, I allow for implicit
cointegrating relationships between the variables. I do not include a constant or time trend and
set the lag length to four.
I estimate the VAR on quarterly data for the period 1987-2005 and provide a summary of
the data sources in Appendix C.1. For stock prices, I use the Dow Jones EURO STOXX Net
Return index (which includes dividends), deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator and transformed in per
capita terms by dividing by the civilian labor force. The index is available from STOXX Limited
and was introduced in 1987, which determines the sample period. To obtain quarterly data,
I average daily ﬁgures. Data on real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, the interest rate and the civilian
48labor force come from the Area-wide Model (AWM) database. I use the civilian labor force to
transform real GDP into per capita terms. Moreover, monetary data (M1) are from the OECD
Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database.
To construct the productivity index, I obtain data on the capital stock (Kt) from the AWM
database and on annual total hours worked (Ht) from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productiv-
ity Accounts. The EU KLEMS database is updated until 2005, which limits my sample period.
Moreover, I use the interpolation method of Fernández (1981) to obtain quarterly ﬁgures on
hours, using real GDP and total employment as indicator series. The latter series is from the
AWM database. Furthermore, the EU KLEMS database provides data on labor and capital com-
pensation, which I use to calculate an average labor share (¯ α = 0.66) for the sample period.
Finally, I construct a measure of (log) total factor productivity as tfpt = log
 
GDPt/H ¯ α
t K1−¯ α
t
 
,
where GDPt denotes real GDP.
For estimation and inference, I employ a Bayesian approach. In particular, I use a weak
Normal-Wishart prior for (A,Σ) as in Uhlig (2005), while shocks are identiﬁed per sign restric-
tions following Canova and De Nicoló (2002). I take a joint draw from (A,Σ) and derive an
orthogonal decomposition of Σ = BB′ = PDP′ using the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposi-
tion. P is a matrix of eigenvectors, D is adiagonal matrix witheigenvalues onthemain diagonal
and B = PD1/2. Given that for any orthonormal matrix Q, i.e. QQ′ = I, Σ = BQQ′B′ = ˆ B ˆ B′
is an admissible decomposition, I can construct a large number of candidate impulse matrices
ˆ B. I generate orthonormal matrices using the multiple of the basic set of Givens matrices as
Q =
 
m,n Qm,n (θ) with Qm,n (θ) being G(G − 1)/2 = 15 bivariate rotation matrices of differ-
ent elements of the VAR: θ = θ1,...,θ15, the rows m,n are rotated by the angle θi. I provide an
example for Qm,n (θ) in Appendix C.2. To exhaust the range of possible decompositions, I do
not use a grid search method as in Canova and De Nicoló (2002) but follow Peersman (2005)
and draw the parameters θi from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,π]. Finally, I calculate
the associated responses for each candidate draw and keep it if all the restrictions are satisﬁed.
Otherwise, I discard it. Based on the draws kept, I calculate the statistics of interest.
3.2.2 Identifying sign restrictions
Sign restrictions on impulse responses are frequently used to identify monetary shocks in VAR
models and widely accepted (see, e.g., Faust, 1998; Canova and De Nicoló, 2002; Uhlig, 2005;
Scholl and Uhlig, 2008, among others). These authors impose a small number of uncontroversial
restrictions on the sign of impulse responses for selected variables, while being agnostic with
respect to the responses of others. This procedure allows them to rule out ’price or liquidity
49Table 3.1: Sign restrictions on impulse responses
Shocks Variables Horizon in quarters
Monetary pt+j ≤ 0, it+j ≥ 0, mt+j ≤ 0 j = 0,...,2
Technology tfpt+j ≥ 0 j = 0,...,7
Technology news
tfpt+j = 0 j = 0,1
tfpt+j ≥ 0 j = 2,...,9
Notes: Horizon 0 denotes the initial response. p = GDP deﬂator; i = interest rate; m = monetary
aggregate; tfp = total factor productivity.
puzzles’ by construction. Consistent with this literature, I impose that a positive interest rate
shock has a negative effect on the monetary aggregate and the GDP deﬂator. I do not restrict the
response of real stock prices to leave the question at hand open. Furthermore, I set the horizon
for the sign restrictions equal to three, i.e. the restrictions are binding on impact and for the
following two quarters. This horizon is within the range used in related studies and rules out
short-lived deviations from a policy rule.
Furthermore, I identify two technology shocks. A technology shock that immediately im-
pacts on productivity. And a technology news shock where the effect of the technology im-
provement on productivity is delayed by two quarters. The results are robust to variations in
this time period. Contrary to other sign restrictions approaches (see, e.g., Dedola and Neri, 2007;
Peersman and Straub, 2009, among others), I do not restrict the response of any other variable.
In particular, I do not require a positive response of real GDP. Given that Basu et al. (2006) obtain
evidence in favor of a contractionary effect of technology improvements in the short-run, this
appears reasonable. I set the horizon over which productivity has to respond positively equal
to eight quarters, consistent with the conventional wisdom that technology improvements have
persistent effects on productivity.
Table 3.1 summarizes the sign restrictions. I impose all restrictions either as ≤ or ≥, while I
implement a zero restriction as ’approximate equality constraint’ following Kilian and Murphy
(2009). That is, the restriction does not have to hold literally, but the response has to be at least
close to zero. In particular, I accept a draw if the response is within the interval +/- 0.00005.
Furthermore, I identify a monetary and in addition either a technology or technology news
shock at the same time to ensure orthogonality between them.
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Figure 3.2: Monetary shocks
Notes: I show the median response, together with the area between the 16th and 84th percentiles. Entries
are percent; horizontal axis denotes quarters after the shock.
3.3 The results
3.3.1 Dynamic responses to monetary and technology shocks
I show the responses to monetary as well as technology shocks in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respec-
tively. In both cases, the ﬁgure plots the median of the posterior distribution, together with the
area between the 16th and 84th percentiles, calculated at each horizon between 0 and 30 quar-
ters after the shock. I construct 250,000 candidate responses, leaving me with about 1,500 draws
that satisfy the restrictions. An acceptance ratio of 0.6% is compatible with related studies.
By construction, the monetary aggregate and the GDP deﬂator fall in response to positive
interest rate shocks. Moreover, both responses are persistent. The response of the interest rate,
however, becomes insigniﬁcant once I remove the restriction, suggesting that the monetary pol-
icy authority reverses course immediately after the shock. Furthermore, productivity and real
GDP display an insigniﬁcant response over all horizons, which is consistent with monetary
neutrality, both in the short and long-run. Overall, these ﬁndings are similar to those of Uhlig
(2005). ’Contractionary’ monetary shocks do not necessarily have to contract real GDP. In Sec-
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Figure 3.3: Technology shocks
Notes: See Figure 3.2
tion 3.3.6, I show that this conclusion is robust to tighter identifying restrictions, such as ﬁxing
the impact response of productivity and real GDP to zero. Most important, I draw the same
conclusion for the impact of monetary shocks on real stock prices. There is no evidence of a
contractionary effect of a monetary tightening on the real stock price index.
I identify technology shocks as having a positive impact on productivity for two years
throughout, enough to induce a permanent upward shift in the level of productivity. More-
over, the response of real GDP is persistently positive as well, while interest rates and the GDP
deﬂator tend to fall. In addition, there is no effect on the monetary aggregate. These ﬁndings are
compatible with conventional wisdom and insensitive to an alternative productivity measure
that adjusts for time-varying capacity utilization. I discuss this issue in Section 3.3.5. Finally, the
response of real stock prices is positive and signiﬁcant on impact and for most of the following
ten quarters. This coincides with the idea that improvements in productivity are accompanied
by stock market booms.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated monetary and technology shocks
Notes: Entries are percent.
3.3.2 Explanatory power of the shocks
Before presenting the responses to the technology news shocks in Section 3.3.4, I investigate the
explanatory power of monetary and technology shocks by means of a forecast error variance
and a historical decomposition. Moreover, I assess their plausibility in Section 3.3.3.
I follow Fry and Pagan (2007) and perform the analysis on the basis of one particular draw
from the posterior distribution. In particular, I choose that draw, which produces impulse re-
sponses that are as close as possible to the median responses. This procedure retains the orthog-
onality between the shocks, while it has the desirable property that variance shares sum exactly
to one. Moreover, it preserves the consensus view that the median is a good summary statistic.
I have checked that the selected draw indeed produces responses that are similar to those gen-
erated by the median of the posterior distribution so that the conclusions of the previous section
are not altered (see Appendix C.3, Figures C.1 and C.2).
Figure 3.4 shows the estimated historical series for both the monetary (upper panel) and
the technology shocks (lower panel). As we can see from the monetary series, the stance of
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Figure 3.5: Historical decomposition of euro area stock prices
Notes: Entries are log levels.
monetary policy in the euro area is tight around 1992-93 and in the early 2000s. In addition, the
series displays the responses to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and ﬁnancial market turmoils in
2002-03. Furthermore, I conclude from an investigation of the technology series that technology
innovations behave similarly to real stock returns over the sample period (see also Figure 3.1,
lower panel). There is a number of large positive shocks during the late 1990s as well as the
early 2000s, while the years 2002-03 are associated with negative disturbances. Moreover, the
correlation between the series is 0.48. These ﬁndings support my idea that stock prices are
driven by technology innovations.
I report in Figure 3.5 how the estimated monetary and technology shocks contribute to his-
torical movements in euro area stock prices. The upper panel plots the actual data, together
with the estimated deterministic component or baseline projection. I obtain the baseline projec-
tion from a counterfactual simulation that no shocks occur during the sample period. Thus, the
baseline projection mirrors the initial conditions, summarized in the ﬁrst four data points. In the
lower panel, I plot that part of the estimated stochastic component that I attribute to monetary
and technology shocks, respectively.
54Table 3.2: Historical business cycle variance decomposition
Variable
Shocks tfpt yt pt it mt st
Monetary 7.29 2.05 6.06 2.99 15.45 4.58
Technology 15.13 17.89 3.99 9.52 18.66 22.31
Other 77.58 80.06 89.95 87.49 65.89 73.11
Notes: Entries are percent. Statistics are calculated on HP-ﬁltered series. tfp = total factor productivity;
y = real GDP; p = GDP deﬂator; i = interest rate; m = monetary aggregate; s = real stock prices.
As we can see from the lower panel, monetary policy mostly contributes positively to devel-
opments in euro area stock prices over the sample period. This ﬁnding is particularly evident
after 1995 when the contribution of monetary shocks is always positive. However, their impact
appears to be small when compared to technology shocks. While their effect on stock prices is
moderate in the ﬁrst part of the sample, technology disturbances are responsible for about half
of the deviation from the baseline projection in 2000 and nearly all in 2002-03. These results
suggest that the pronounced boom-bust cycle in euro area stock markets in 1995-2003 is to a
large extent due to technology disturbances.
In order to quantify the importance of monetary and technology shocks for historical move-
ments in stock prices and other variables, I conduct a historical business cycle variance decom-
position and report the results in Table 3.2. The entries in the table refer to the fraction of the
variance in variables that can be accounted for by the shocks, obtained from the counterfactual
simulation that only a single shock occurs. Before constructing the variance shares, I apply the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter to the series resulting from the counterfactual simulation to empha-
size ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies.
I ﬁnd an important role for technology shocks in explaining business cycle variations in
stock prices. About 22% of the variation can be attributed to such shocks, hence they are more
important than monetary shocks that explain less than 5%. Moreover, I identify technology
shocks as an important driver of ﬂuctuations in real GDP, explaining roughly 18% of the vari-
ation. In contrast, monetary shocks are responsible for a mere 2%. These ﬁndings are different
from these of Galí (1999), who ﬁnds no role for technology in explaining aggregate ﬂuctuations.
However, they are consistent with Dedola and Neri (2007), Enders et al. (2008) or Peersman and
55Table 3.3: Forecast error variance decomposition
Variable
Shocks tfpt yt pt it mt st
Monetary 10.69 10.31 21.35 1.98 7.47 6.25
Technology 18.15 20.82 2.15 8.17 7.87 11.91
Other 71.16 68.87 76.50 89.85 84.66 81.84
Notes: Entries are percent. The horizon is 30 quarters. See notes to Table 3.2 for abbreviations.
Straub (2009), who all build their analysis on identifying sign restrictions. Of course, I cannot
rule out that this difference is the result of other factors, like the choice of the sample period.
I end this part by presenting the forecast error variance decomposition in Table 3.3. The
variance decomposition is based on the impulse responses of the previous section (i.e. on the
chosen draw, not on the median). The entries in the table refer to the fraction of the variance in
the forecast error that can be attributed to monetary, technology and other shocks, respectively.
The forecast horizon is 30 quarters. I perform the exercise to provide insights about the predic-
tive ability of the shocks over a long-term horizon rather than over the business cycle as in case
of the business cycle variance decomposition.
Table 3.3 shows that more than 20% of the variability in real GDP can be accounted for by
technology shocks, conﬁrming such shocks as a main driver of aggregate ﬂuctuations. Mone-
tary shocks, however, explain only 10% of the variance in the forecast error of real GDP. Most
important, technology shocks contribute around 12% to the variance in the forecast error of real
stock prices. This number is smaller than the 22% coming from the business cycle decompo-
sition but larger than the 6% that can be attributed to monetary shocks. Furthermore, across
all variables between 68% and 89% of the variance in the forecast error is neither explained by
monetary nor by technology shocks. These numbers are not unusual, given that shocks are
identiﬁed on the basis of sign restrictions alone. In particular, technology shocks contribute not
more than 18% to the variability in productivity even though I identify technology shocks as
having a persistent effect on productivity. The same statistic obtained from the long-run restric-
tion approach of Galí (1999) would be, nearly by construction, considerably larger. I return to
this issue in Section 3.3.6.
56Table 3.4: Granger causality tests
Variable
Shocks Government expenditure Hamilton oil shocks Interest rate R2 ¯ R2
Monetary 0.9809 0.1234 0.6722 0.19 0.00
Technology 0.6888 0.1995 0.3055 0.16 0.00
Notes: Entries are probabilties from a F-test. The F-test is based on the regression of the estimated shocks
on a constant and four lags of the variables. For the oil shocks, I also include the current value. The null
hypothesis is that all of the coefﬁcients on the variable in question are jointly equal to zero.
3.3.3 Are the estimated shocks plausible?
Before proceeding, I assess the plausibility of the approach by subjecting the estimated mon-
etary and technology shocks to additional tests. If both shocks reﬂect exogenous innovations
to monetary policy and productivity, they should be uncorrelated to other exogenous shocks
or lagged endogenous variables. In detail, I investigate whether the government expenditure
to GDP ratio, the Hamilton (1996) oil shock measure, and the nominal short-term interest rate
Granger-cause the estimated shocks. Similar testing procedures are developed in Hall (1988)
and Evans (1992) (so called ’Evans-Hall’ tests) and frequently used in the literature (see, e.g.,
Francis and Ramey, 2005; Fisher, 2006, among others). The three variables are considered be-
cause they are associated with business cycle ﬂuctuations, but not related to technology im-
provements. Moreover, Hoover and Perez (1994) and Bernanke et al. (1997) point out that peaks
in oil prices and policy interest rates often coincide, making it difﬁcult to distinguish between
oil and monetary shocks.
The data on government expenditures and oil prices are from the AWM database. Further-
more, Hamilton calculates his oil shock measure by taking the difference between the quarterly
oil price and the maximum oil price of the preceeding four quarters. He sets the value to zero
in case the difference is negative. Though Hamilton (1996) convincingly argues in favor of such
an asymmetric oil price measure, I consider the quarterly change in oil prices as an alternative.
The Granger causality test is based on a regression of the estimated monetary and technology
shocks on a constant and four lags of the government expenditure to GDP ratio, the oil shock
measure and the interest rate. I also add the contemporaneous value for the oil shocks since I do
not expect that they respond to technology improvements within the period. Moreover, interest
rates enter the regression in ﬁrst differences to ensure stationarity.
57I show the results in Table 3.4. For both shocks, the explanatory power of the set of variables
is low. The R2 is 0.19 for the regression involving the monetary shocks and 0.16 for the tech-
nology shocks while the adjusted ¯ R2 is zero in both cases. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that any of the variables Granger-causes the two shock series. I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that all of the coefﬁcients on the variable in question are jointly equal to zero at conventional
signiﬁcance levels for any variable. I obtain the lowest probability values for the oil shocks (0.12
and 0.19 for the monetary and technology shocks, respectively). But even then the signiﬁcance
is above 10 percent. Moreover, these numbers do not signiﬁcantly change when I replace the oil
shock measure by the quarterly change in oil prices (see Appendix C.3, Table C.1). In this case I
do not include the oil price contemporaneously to avoid endogeneity problems.
Hence, the Granger causality test supports my interpretation of the shocks as exogenous
innovations to monetary policy and productivity. Given the fact that technology innovations
coming from traditional long-run restriction methods or Solow residual regressions often fail
’Evans-Hall’ type tests, this is encouraging.
3.3.4 Dynamic responses to technology news shocks
As an extension, I provide evidence on the effects of technology news shocks on stock prices.
By construction, technology improvements no longer raise productivity immediately but with
a delay of two quarters. Such a shock process is not easily supported by the data and I have
to increase the number of candidate draws considerably. Less than 0.1% of the candidates are
accepted. Figure 3.6 shows the results. As in Figure 3.2, I report the median of the posterior
distribution, together with the area between the 16th and 84th percentiles, based on about 1,500
draws that fulﬁll the restrictions.
The exercise produces the following results. First, real GDP responds to the technology
improvement only after productivity has increased, consistent with the notion that production
capacities adjust slowly. Second, the GDP deﬂator as well as interest rates and monetary ag-
gregates react immediately and display responses that are comparable to those in Figure 3.3.
Moreover, stock prices show a large and positive response on impact, reﬂecting the anticipated
increase in productivity. The response is signiﬁcantly above zero for three years after the shock.
Thus, stock prices (and all other variables, except productivity and real GDP) respond instanta-
neously to the news about the technology improvement with the actual increase in productivity
having little or no effect. Third, the posterior distribution is less dispersed, probably due to the
additional retrictions, leading to tighter conﬁdence bands. Overall, the ﬁndings are consistent
with the predictions of the class of diffusion models outlined in the introduction.
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Figure 3.6: Technology news shocks
Notes: See Figure 3.2
3.3.5 Controlling for time-varying capacity utilization
As a ﬁrst sensitivity check, I investigate whether the results depend on the speciﬁcation of the
productivity index. The literature does not provide a unique answer to the question how to best
measure productivity. For example, O’Mahoney and Timmer (2009) control for changes in the
composition of labor and capital. Moreover, Basu et al. (2006) construct a productivity series
for the U.S. from disaggregated data while taking time variations in the utilization of labor and
capital into account. Most of these adjustments, however, are either beyond the scope of this
paper or not applicable because the relevant data are not available for the euro area. Here, I
focus on the role of time-varying capacity utilization since it appears to be an important factor
in Beaudry and Portier (2006) as well as Basu et al. (2006). Moreover, I have data on the usage
of capital in the manufacturing sector and thus can proxy for variations in the utilization of
the whole economy capital stock for which no data are available. I obtain the series from the
OECD MEI database. I construct the adjusted (log) total factor productivity series as tfpA
t =
log
 
GDPt/H ¯ α
t (CUtKt)
1−¯ α
 
, where CUt is the rate of capacity utilization.
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Figure 3.7: TFP measures
Notes: All entries are annualized quarterly growth rates. Solid line: unadjusted TFP; dashed line: TFP
adjusted for time-varying capacity utilization. The shaded areas represent CEPR expansions.
Figure 3.7 plots the adjusted productivity measure (dashed line), together with the unad-
justed series (solid line). For comparability, I show annualized quarterly growth rates. To
demonstrate the cyclical behavior of both series, Figure 3.7 displays the euro area expansions as
dated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) (shaded area). The dates are available
on the CEPR homepage and provided in Appendix C.1. The CEPR deﬁnes an expansion as a
prolongedperiodofincreasinggrowthofrealGDP,wherethestarting(ending)pointisthepoint
of minimal (maximal) growth. As you can see, the unadjusted productivity measure is highly
pro-cyclical. Troughs and peaks in the series often coincide with starting and ending points of
expansions. Furthermore, the correlation of productivity with annualized quarterly real GDP
growth (not shown here) is about 0.95. Correcting for time-varying capacity utilization, how-
ever, makes productivity less pro-cyclical. This results from the fact that capacity utilization
itself is highly pro-cyclical. In this case, starting and ending points of expansions are often pre-
ceeded by troughs and peaks in productivity and the correlation with real GDP growth declines
to 0.72. Of course, this correlation is still high and adjusted productivity is not counter-cyclical
as in Basu et al. (2006). A possible explanation is that I do not (and simply cannot) control for
unobserved labor effort as they do. Despite this drawback, the exercise is useful to examine the
robustness of my previous results.
Do the responses to a technology improvement change when productivity is corrected for
variations in the utilization of capital? Figure 3.8 provides an answer. Essentially, all of the
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Figure 3.8: Technology shocks when controlling for time-varying capacity utilization
Notes: See Figure 3.2
variables show responses that are similar to those reported in Figure 3.3. However, the positive
response of real GDP is delayed by about one year, and I cannot rule out a negative response on
impact. ThisisconsistentwiththeﬁndingsofBasuetal.(2006), whodemonstratethatifcapacity
utilization is taken into account, technology improvements lead to a fall in hours worked and
reduced utilization of capital in the short-run with real GDP being unchanged for some time.
Moreover, thisﬁndingcastsdoubtonidentiﬁcationschemeswhichbuildontheassumptionthat
real GDP immediately increases when technology improves (see, e.g., Dedola and Neri, 2007;
Peersman and Straub, 2009, among others). Finally, the response for stock prices is not as sharp
at the short end as before, but still signiﬁcantly above its initial level over the medium-term.
3.3.6 Comparing the sign restrictions to short and long-run restrictions
As a second sensitivity check, I assess whether imposing additional short and long-run restric-
tions leads to qualitative changes in the impulse responses. In particular, I do not allow for a
contemporaneous response of productivity and real GDP to monetary shocks and require that
technology shocks account for at least half of the variation in productivity at a horizon of 30
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Figure 3.9: Monetary shocks when ﬁxing the initial TFP and real GDP response to zero
Notes: See Figure 3.2
quarters. I impose the latter restriction on the forecast error variance share. Essentially, these
additional restrictions move my identiﬁcation scheme towards short and long-run restriction
approaches.
My motivation for ﬁxing the initial responses of productivity and real GDP to zero is the
following. As you can see in Figure 3.2, both variables as well as real stock prices tend to
increase after positive interest rate shocks (though not signiﬁcantly), which is counterintuitive.
Hence, I ﬁnd it worth investigating if this ﬁnding is sensitive to the relatively weak identifying
assumptions made. A delayed response of real GDP to monetary shocks is often assumed in the
monetary VAR literature. Furthermore, I justify the restriction on the variance share as follows.
It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a decomposition of the covariance matrix that supports a large contribution
of technology shocks to long-run movements in productivity when shocks are identiﬁed on the
basis of sign restrictions alone. Therefore, among the draws that satisfy the set of restrictions, I
extract those that are associated with exceptionally large and permanent effects on productivity.
Of course, the horizon of 30 quarters (the ’long-run’) as well as the 50 percent threshold (’large’)
are to some extent arbitrary, but the results of this exercise appear robust to variations in both.
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Figure 3.10: Technology shocks when requiring a large contribution to long-run TFP
changes
Notes: See Figure 3.2
I show the responses to monetary and technology shocks under the extended set of restric-
tions in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. It seems that ﬁxing the initial responses for pro-
ductivity and real GDP to zero after a monetary shock hardly alters the ﬁndings of Section 3.3.1.
Though both variables have now the tendency to fall in the short-run, they do so by little. More-
over, the response of the real stock price index is not affected. In contrast, restricting variance
shares has consequences. The posterior distribution is less dispersed than those in Figure 3.3.
Given that only 7% of the posterior draws satisfy the long-run restriction, this is not surprising.
Speciﬁcally, the responses for productivity, real GDP and the GDP deﬂator display tight conﬁ-
dence bands. Moreover, the subset of technology shocks which is associated with exceptionally
large and permanent effects on productivity increases productivity growth, not only the level
of productivity. As a consequence, the median response for stock prices shifts upwards, sug-
gesting a permanent impact of changes in productivity growth on the level of stock prices. This
ﬁnding coincides with the result of the long-run restriction approach of Beaudry and Portier
(2006).
633.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide evidence on the impact of monetary and technology shocks on real
stock prices using a Bayesian VAR model for the euro area. I achieve identiﬁcation by imposing
sign restrictions on impulse responses as in Canova and De Nicoló (2002) or Uhlig (2005). The
results suggest an important role for technology shocks, but not monetary shocks, in explaining
variations in stock prices. Over the sample period, technology shocks account for more than
22% of the movements in stock prices while monetary shocks contribute less than 5%. Specif-
ically, the pronounced boom-bust cycle of 1995-2003 can almost completely be attributed to
technology shocks. I also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant response of stock prices to technology news shocks.
Furthermore, I investigate the robustness of these ﬁndings with respect to (a) an alterna-
tive measure of productivity which adjusts for time-varying capacity utilization and (b) the
inclusion of additional short and long-run restrictions. Moreover, I show that monetary and
technology shocks are not correlated with omitted variables and shocks, such as government
spending or oil prices.
This last result leads me to conclude that the estimated shocks are plausible, while the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy is at the same time less dogmatic than those typically found in the literature.
Moreover, I show how to combine short and long-run as well as sign restrictions in a convenient
way. In particular, the use of zero restrictions, not only on impact but for an extended horizon,
allows me to study the effects of anticipated shocks. An exercise which has been rarely under-
taken yet. Needless to say, such a framework can be applied to anticipated shocks other than
technology news shocks.
Finally, the analysis offers an explanation for the stylized fact that real stock returns and
inﬂation are negatively correlated. Given the evidence of this paper that, ﬁrst, real stock prices
are to a large extent driven by technology shocks and, second, the conditional correlation of
real stock returns and inﬂation is negative for technology shocks, I conclude that the correlation
pattern in the data is to a certain degree the result of technology disturbances. This appears
particularly relevant for the late 1990s when a series of positive technology shocks hit the euro
area economy, leading to positive real stock returns and low inﬂation rates. Moreover, the anal-
ysis helps to understand why the stock market boom of 1995-2000 coincided with a period of
falling interest rates. Rather than being the source of this boom, falling interest rates reﬂected
an improved trade-off between output and inﬂation due to enhanced technology.
64A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 The data
The data are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators data base and IMF’s International Fi-
nancial Statistics. The estimation period is 1980Q1-2007Q4. I obtain data on real GDP from the
IMF with the exception of Canada and Italy where I use data from the OECD. For New Zealand,
real GDP data for the early 1980s are not available on a quarterly basis. Therefore, I interpolate
annual real GDP with the Chow and Lin (1971) procedure, using industrial production as an
indicator series, and link this series to the quarterly OECD series starting in 1982Q2.
Data on consumer prices are from the OECD. If necessary, I deseasonalize consumer prices
and real GDP using the X-11 ﬁlter. I take the U.S. dollar price of Brent crude oil from the OECD.
Short-term interest rates are 3-month rates and, where available, I use Treasury bill rates from
the IMF. For Australia, Austria, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden,
Treasury bill rates are not available and I use money market rates instead. Furthermore, in case
of New Zealand and Norway I use interbank rates from the OECD. For the euro area economies,
I replace domestic short-term interest rates by the 3-month EURIBOR rate after 1998. Data on
long-term interest rates are from the IMF for Austria, Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway and Sweden;
for all other countries from the OECD. In each case the long-term interest rate is the yield on a
10-year government bond. Stock prices are from the IMF, except for Switzerland and the United
Kingdom where I use data from the OECD. For all countries, I use a broad stock price index.
The real effective exchange rate is a trade weighted index, adjusted for relative consumer prices
and comes from the IMF. In case of Korea the index is from the OECD.
In order to obtain current account to GDP ratios, I divide the nominal current account by
nominal GDP of the same period. Current account data come from the IMF, except for Germany
and Switzerland where the data are from the OECD. For Norway, I replace missing observations
for 1992Q1-1993Q4 with data from Statistics Norway. Nominal GDP data are from the IMF and
in case of New Zealand I again interpolate GDP from annual to quarterly frequency for the early
1980s. Since the current account is denominated in U.S. dollar, I convert it to domestic currency
using bilateral U.S. dollar market exchange rates from the OECD, with the exception of Korea
where I use data from the IMF. Finally, the bilateral trade ﬂows that I use to construct trade
weights are from the OECD. Unfortunately, there are missing values in trade ﬂows between
Belgium, Korea and New Zealand prior to 1988. I deal with this problem by setting trade ﬂows
between these countries equal to zero for all years up to 1988. Since trade between the three
countries was limited until the late-1990s, it is unlikely that this contaminates the trade weights.
65A.2 Error bands
To construct error bands for impulse responses, I use the continuous-path block-bootstrap of
Politis (2003). The bootstrap takes the I(1) property of the series into account and is imple-
mented as follows. Suppose a series zt is non-stationary, t = 1,2,...,T, and an initial ob-
servation z0 is available. First, I calculate the series of stationary ﬁrst differences ∆zt, where
∆zt = zt − zt−1. Second, I perform a block-bootstrap of the ﬁrst differences ∆zt by randomly
drawingblocksofsizefourwithreplacementfrom∆z1,∆z2,...,∆zT, yielding∆z∗
1,∆z∗
2,...,∆z∗
T.
Letting the block size vary between 2 and 12 produces similar error bands. Third, I construct a
bootstrap series for zt by ’integrating’ the ∆z∗
t, i.e. z∗
t = z0 +
 t
i=1 ∆z∗
i . Fourth, I use the boot-
strap series z∗
t to re-estimate the coefﬁcients of the panel VAR. Finally, I calculate the bootstrap
impulse responses. I repeat the steps 1,000 times and hence obtain a distribution of impulse
responses. I calculate 90 percent conﬁdence intervals as follows
CI =
 
ˆ φ + 1.645 ×
 
var
 
ˆ φ∗
   1
2 , ˆ φ − 1.645 ×
 
var
 
ˆ φ∗
   1
2
 
,
where ˆ φ are the impulse responses based on the original data and ˆ φ∗ are the bootstrap counter-
parts.
66B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Transformation of the covariance matrix
Premultiply Yt = Xtδ + ut with
P =


 
 

P−1
1 0 ... 0
0 IG ... 0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
0 0 ... IG


 
 

NG×NG
which yields
PYt = PXtδ + ǫt,
where ǫt = (ǫ′
1t,u′
2t,...,u′
Nt) and thus
Σǫ = E
 
ǫtǫ′
t
 
=

 
 


IG Σǫ1,u2 ... Σǫ1,uN
Σu2,ǫ1 Σu2 ...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
ΣuN,ǫ1 ΣuN,u2 ... ΣuN

 
 


NG×NG
is the transformed covariance matrix with Σǫ = PΣuP′.
B.2 The data
DataonnationalaccountsandgovernmentbudgetoutcomesarefromtheOECDEconomicOut-
look database. I use the series CGV, IGV, GDPV, CPV, IPV, PGDP, and NLGXQ. Since the June
2006 volume is the most recent one that provides estimates of quarterly government budget
outcomes for the G-7 countries (not for Italy though), I do not consider data later than 2005Q4. I
obtaintheseriesforItalyfromtheDecember2004vintageeventhoughthelastfourobservations
are forecasts. Data on interest rates (3-month Treasury Bill or money market rates), monetary
aggregates (M0 for the UK, M1 otherwise) and stock prices are from IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics database. For Italy and France, M1 data are from Eurostat. In case of Germany,
France and Italy, I use national ﬁgures on interest rates and monetary aggregates up to 1998Q4,
but those for the euro area thereafter. Except for stock prices and interest rates, I deseasonalize
all series.
67C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 The data
I use data from ﬁve different sources which are all accessible through the web: the Area-wide
Model database (http://www.eabcn.org/area-wide-model), the EU KLEMS Growth and Pro-
ductivity Accounts(http://www.euklems.net/), theOECD MainEconomicIndicators database
(http://www.oecd.org), STOXX Limited (http://www.stoxx.com/index.html), and the CEPR
(http://www.cepr.org/Data/euroCOIN/recession/). Theestimationperiodis1987Q1-2005Q4.
To obtain quarterly data, I average daily ﬁgures and convert yearly series using interpolation
methods.
Area-wide Model database (series are quarterly):
Real GDP in millions of euro with reference year 1995, seasonally adjusted, YER
GDP deﬂator with reference year 1995, seasonally adjusted, YED
Whole-economy capital stock in millions of euro with reference year 1995, KSR
Nominal short-term interest rate in percent, STN
Civilian labor force in thousands of persons, LFN
Total employment in thousands of persons, LNN
Government expenditure to GDP ratio, GEN_YEN
Oil prices in U.S. dollars, POILU
EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (series are yearly):
Total hours worked by employees in millions of hours, H_EMPE
Labor compensation in millions of euro, LAB
Capital compensation in millions of euro, CAP
OECD Main Economic Indicators database (series are quarterly):
Monetary Aggregate M1 in billions of euro, seasonally adjusted, EA6003DSA
Rate of capacity utilization in percent, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, EA2961DSA
STOXX Limited (series is daily):
Dow Jones EURO STOXX Net Return index (including dividends)
CEPR Expansion dates:
Jan 1988 - Feb 1989, Nov 1992 - Oct 1994, Nov 1995 - Nov 1997, Oct 1998 - Nov 1999
68C.2 Rotation matrices
In the context of my six variable VAR a 6 × 6 Givens matrix Q3,4 (θ10) has the form
Q3,4 (θ10) =


 
 

 
 

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 cos(θ10) −sin(θ10) 0 0
0 0 sin(θ10) cos(θ10) 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


 
 

 
 

i.e. the matrix is the identity matrix in which the (3,4) and (4,3) elements are replaced by the sine
terms and θ10 lies within [0,π]. Accordingly, I replace the (3,3) and (4,4) elements by the cosine
terms. To construct Q, I use the multiple of the basic set of Givens matrices: Q = Q1,2 (θ1) ×
Q1,3 (θ2) × ... × Q5,6 (θ15).
C.3 Additional tables and ﬁgures
Table C.1: Granger causality tests with oil price
Variable
Shocks Government expenditure Oil price Interest rate R2 ¯ R2
Monetary 0.8673 0.1354 0.6101 0.17 0.00
Technology 0.7741 0.1208 0.2449 0.16 0.00
Notes: Entries are probabilties from a F-test. The F-test is based on the regression of the estimated shocks
on a constant and four lags of the variables. The null hypothesis is that all of the coefﬁcients on the
variable in question are jointly equal to zero.
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Figure C.1: Monetary shocks with responses under single draw restriction
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Figure C.2: Technology shocks with responses under single draw restriction
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